


2023 Auxiliary Safety Climate Survey Response Results

Note: the Likert scale ranges from 1 = Strongly disagree, to 5 = Strongly agree


C1 I know what a mishap is

2,105 responses




C2 I know how to report a mishap

2,095 responses




C3 I know why near miss reporting is important

2,105 responses




C4 I am comfortable reporting near-misses ("close calls", events that likely could have become a mishap) and other unsafe behaviors, practices or hazards.

2,103 responses




C5 I am confident that I can report anonymously

2,090 responses




C6 Auxiliary Leaders care about my safety

2,105 responses




C7 Mishap reporting will make the Coast Guard Auxiliary a safer place to volunteer

2,106 responses




P1 I know how to find and access Coast Guard Auxiliary safety policy.

2,109 responses




P2 I am knowledgeable in the Coast Guard Auxiliary safety policy that applies to my primary duties.

2,105 responses




L1 Leaders react to unexpected events appropriately.

2,069 responses




L2 Leaders place a high value on safety.

2,095 responses




L3 Safety training/briefs are conducted regularly.

2,079 responses




L4 Leaders provide opportunity for feedback.

2,084 responses




L5 Auxiliary Leadership is aware of the risks and hazards faced by members.

2,088 responses




Rm1 I feel empowered to halt unsafe activities.

2,101 responses




Rm2 I feel empowered to make decisions in light of a task's risks and gains.

2,088 responses




Rm3 Leaders are effective at teaching how to assess risks and gains.

2,091 responses




Rm4 Auxiliary leaders know how to manage the risks and hazards I face with CG Auxiliary work.

2,076 responses




R1 I have the PPE and other safety resources I need to work safely

2,046 responses




R2 I receive sufficient training to effectively accomplish my Auxiliary duties.

2,086 responses



R3 I am confident I know what to do in the event of an emergency.

2,092 responses



SAFETY COMMENTS


Enter your comments here

735 responses

See separate page


What Office do you hold in the Auxiliary?

2,104 responses



How long have you served in the USCG Auxiliary?


2,107 responses



- 1. 0-2 Years
- 2. 2-4 years
- 3. 4-6 years
- 4. 6 -10 years
- 5. 10 -20 years
- 6. 20+ Years

What is your Primary Auxiliary Function?


2,023 responses



- 1. Surface Operations
- 2. Aviation Operations
- 3. Land Operations – Telecommunications, AUXFS, PA, PB, etc.
- 4. RBS – VE, PE, PV, Paddlecraft, etc.

What is your Secondary Auxiliary Function?


1,842 responses



- 1. Surface Operations
- 2. Aviation Operations
- 3. Land Operations – Telecommunications, AUXFS, PA, PB, etc.
- 4. RBS – VE, PE, PV, Paddlecraft, etc.

Do you have Academic or Profesional Safety Expertise (safety related degree, board certification, specialized training, etc.)?

2,095 responses



Text Field Comments

1. Enter your comments here (This comment made during form testing)
2. All fives in Chrome (This comment made during form testing)
3. All ones in Safari (This comment made during form testing)
4. none
5. Have been an Aux member less than 120 days.
6. 08-5-11 is an awesome Flotilla to be a part of!
7. Implementing rules and regulations is easy from the top; funding and training must be completed before the implementation.
8. Safety is paramount in Coast Guard & Auxillary
9. There are no points of improvement to attitudes.
10. I feel safe and I know I can report issues when work at Sector....
11. My flotilla and its leadership does an insufficient job protecting its members from violence, bigotry, and harassment by other members.
12. The training I have received thus far is exemplary and a credit to the auxiliary.
13. N/A
14. Short term/long term memory loss, early onset dementia/Alzheimers among Auxiliarists and spouses is an increasingly significant risk factor among an aging Auxiliary population. It is a difficult subject and we do not once discuss failing long term health as a risk factor in TCT. We should. PS I changed my answer on confidence level in anonymous mishap or near miss reporting. I am not sure how that would look, whether anonymity is appropriate, or what an anonymous report would even look like. In any case, I don't think it would ultimately be very anonymous in practice. A lot of things are supposed to be confidential or anonymous in life; they are not.
15. In the end safety comes down to common sense no matter how much training and preparation we might have.
16. Nothing to add
17. I'm no longer boat crew so didn't respond to the PPE question (N.A. would have been the answer)
18. There should be standards for leaders to qualify them for office that include 500 operational hours, qualified in three or more activities, more than ten years in the auxiliary, and much more.
19. My position doesn't require PPE however I have safety training provided by other organizations, like KKCERT, not every recruit has extensive training.
20. Na
21. Sometimes hazards exist at CG ststions/ ships where we work, sometimes when a hazard is reported the CG doesn't do anything to alleviate the situation until someone gets hurt.
22. At our Flotilla and Division level we work very hard to ensure safety is stressed to everyone in all facets of our jobs and in our personal lives. I sometimes feel that the District and upper levels do not reciprocate to the same level of concern, and reach out to talk and listen to what is of concern and importance at the deckplate level.

23. Nice survey.
24. The auxiliary at many times goes overboard on policy and procedure, creating the inability to get the mission done
25. Calculation of the new GAR score should be objective, but really is not. The choice of go/no go can be manipulated pretty easily. There must be a better way! Perhaps you could make it strictly quantitative, but this would also likely introduce subjectivity. Right now, it makes you stop and think "do I really want to do this mission?" Maybe that is enough!
26. There is eliminating risk and managing risk. If risk can be effectively managed with proper planning for a task it ought to continue if reward is valuable and clear. Tired of "that's too risky " when in the past it was done successfully and without incident.
27. None
28. In my experience CGA leadership has always maintained a safety first attitude, with proper equipment and training.
29. Most of what I know about safety and security I learned it in the Navy, Army National Guard and most recently through non- CGAUX educational programs which I adapt to my CGAUX duties. We suck when it comes to both, safety and most importantly, security. We need to improve our skills and efficiency if we are to be really valuable assets to USCG and our Nation.
30. I am not sure how I would react suddenly in an emergency. Panic might set in.
31. We generally patrol close to a large harbor / port .. need to know a little more about what to do in more open areas, away from safe harbors.
32. Making us wear polo shirts or yacht club type clothes does not make us safer. We should wear the same uniform as the gold side just with silver trim, or we lose credibility with the public.
33. I believe the Auxiliary does a fantastic job with a safety culture.
34. I have been fortunate to train with leadership that has years of experience in USCG Aux and on the open water in their professional life.
35. Woke and racism are very high, anti white, anti Jew left politics prevail making unsafe environment. Required COVID vax nearly destroyed programs, poorly run by political hacks
36. As a crew member, I feel comfortable discussing risks and safety. As a flotilla member, I do not feel comfortable discussing much of anything because our leadership contradicts everything I say.
37. A lot of important training is not provided.
38. Auxiliary leadership doesn't seem to care one way or the other about anything beside stroking their own egos. When I work directly with the Active Coast Guard, it is clear they really do care about safety and teamwork. I much prefer directly with the Active Duty folks than the Auxiliary. Fortunately, they really need, and appreciate, my assistance.
39. I understood all questions perfectly.
40. Although we may all have the same training, not everyone applies the standards equally.
41. While we discuss safety in class room or at a briefing before getting underway. We do not talk enough about reporting a near miss or how to report a mishap with the understanding that it is for our own benefit
42. Surface/Air Ops patrols and VE's are the most likely areas for CGA risk or injury. I believe that the CGA leadership is well aware of this and promotes safety precautions/training in these areas.
43. I think, perhaps, that some worthy missions are never even considered because of an overly pessimistic RM assessment of volunteer capabilities. Some Members would be fit for more adventurous duties, which could improve recruitment and retention.

44. Some leader ship take advantage of newer Auxiliarist, by allowing people who are not qualified to work as boat crew. If a member is not able to work as boat crew, they should be told that.. I understand if someone has been boat crew for many years, but once they are physically, not able to walk without a cane, they should be told to resign as. Boat crew. Allowing someone on a boat who is not able to get up one step or down one step without assistance is just wrong..
45. While Auxiliary leadership provides a safe space for reporting of mishaps, Active Duty do not and have denied a legitimate claim because they said it was "your crew's fault" which was not true. The other boat's crew was at fault, but they did not sustain damages - only me. Following this incident, I no longer feel compelled to file a claim or report a mishap or near miss because it will come back on me even if it was not my or my crew's fault. We were denied an appeal and it left me with a very negative feeling toward reporting. The decision was made based only on the written reports without actual interviews of the principals and was unacceptable to me. We need to get Active Duty in sync with us and have a clear policy for appeals after a thorough examination and interview of those involved in the mishap. Water under the bridge today, but it needs to be incorporated in policy for the future.
46. I do not feel that most Auxiliary leaders allow open channel for feedback and don't handle emergencies very well.
47. Often, it is dependent on the leader or supervisor as to how well they treat safety and or train. I have run into situations where they were underresourced or not able to provide detailed information
48. Safety should always be considered in everything we do and always be taken seriously
49. Answers to these questions depend highly on the specific individuals that you regularly work with.
50. I spent 30 years in the Irish War 1969-1999, facing death every day, always looking for people who can do the same, to feel safe, with mutual support. Currently planting black eye eyed beans and similar survival foods, in case of a nuclear attack, civil war and similar. Always learning about the homesteads, living off the grid.
51. Never been out on the water for ops so don't know if that type of mission would provide different and distinct answers.
52. Our Flotilla Leaders are knowledgeable and professional. Their preparedness is informative and learned.
53. I started with the Auxiliary in 1995 to help boating safety. Safety has been the single most important aspect of being an Auxiliarist, and upholding leaderships outlook on mission accomplishment means safety is ahead of anything about numbers.
54. The amount of lip service given to the crises of the day is sometimes outstanding. My District has a strategic plan that emphasizes the desire to have a climate of safety with certain officers charged with "making that happen". As a senior manager for two Auxiliary programs, one of which is directly responsible for assuring safety I can vouch that my district, beyond the gold plated words of the strategic plan, has done NOTHING to advance the culture of safety. It has not appointed, for example, a surface operations safety officer (akin to the Flight Safety Officer in the air program) which would be a major step in implanting a surface safety program. Nor has it had any meetings to discuss such issues -- meetings that should involve program managers from a whole lot of disciplines. But move beyond the obvious - what about safety while conducting Vessel Safety Checks? Or how about AUXCA1 in a galley (a knife can do a lot of damage). How about just getting to a meeting in the dead of winter with temperatures below zero and ice on the roads?
55. I feel it is hard to navigate auxdata to find some of the safety rules. I know in my first Flotilla was unconcerned with safety or training or even mentorship but my new Flotilla is all about safety and its people. Great program.
56. Overall I feel Auxiliary Leadership understands, practices and reinforces safety and risk assessment.

57. I hear about Boating Safety but nothing about our safety.
58. Been away for a while. They moved my unit to a different location
59. NA
60. Slowly but surely the Auxiliary is moving closer to a better culture of safety. It will take time and persistent leadership. I have noticed that there are a few very senior leaders who have no operational experience and are unaware of the demands placed on operationally active surface ops members.
61. Elected Officers is a poor way to get qualified members into higher position. It breeds a "good old boy" network that is hard to break.
62. We need short safety training regularly on a myriad of topics as reminders of best practices.
63. Some of the Division leadership does not engage until they need help with something to get them ahead or need to provided for there own benefits. They are never in touch with other members at the lower level. If you ask for information they never get back to you or say it is AUXDATA that is the problem. Never return your calls. Never get back to you. They tell you they will take care of it and never do. It is easy for them to pass the buck to someone else.
64. Active duty do not invite Auxiliary to training opportunities that Auxiliary could benefit or for "fellowship" opportunities.
65. Training with the proper PPE equipment is essential to the safety of the missions. Mishaps should be made transparent to all in order to reduce incidents. leadership tenure should be limited to allow more diversity decisions should be made by a board of officers and members
66. This survey is (in my opinion) too vague. The questions ask if someone "knows" something, but doesn't state what represents the knowledge. So, even if two people say that they know how to report an incident, there is no way to tell if those two people are stating they know same thing or not. Many of the questions ask about even more subjective topics, and I don't feel comfortable answering questions where my response could be interpreted any way that the asker wants too. For example, "I know why near miss reporting is important". There is no clear definition of a "near miss". It is entirely subjective. There is a point where the person doesn't consider the factors sufficient to be a near miss, but since we all have different points where a factor becomes a near miss, this question doesn't really supply information that is actionable. If 99% of the people agree with that statement, does it mean that they will report incidents with high risk, or does it mean that they ignore risks that are not realized. Another example, "I am confident I know what to do in the event of an emergency." If someone agrees, does that mean they are very competent, or that they lack imagination of what can occur? Your question doesn't distinguish between those, so good luck in interpreting the answer. And finally, "Auxiliary Leadership is aware of the risks and hazards faced by members." You ask for a rating that goes from "disagree to agree", but you don't have a response for "Unknown, as I have never heard someone from the 'leadership' talk about safety". Just by asking the question, people will answer it, even if they do not have sufficient facts to make an informed response. It doesn't seem like you're really trying to ask questions and get valid results. The questions are so vague that two people with very different viewpoints may respond the same way trying to indicate very different answers. You've got no way to separate those responses and get useful info.
67. As a Vessel Exsminer and being in public there is no method of securing your safety. As manu times you are alone, in a Gov uniform. So base on LE safety we should have the same. I addressed this a decade ago and it was mentioned your on your own!

68. I am no longer in the Auxiliary, I have given 56 years of my life with the uscg, active, Reserve and Auxiliary
69. The Auxiliary leadership is misogynistic, dismissive and still works on the good old boy principal, or what do I get out of it mind set. Have no regard for policy when it is self serving, or need to cover their ass.
70. I do not presently have PPE. It has been ordered but not received yet
71. None
72. I am safe
73. They should be in conjunction with emergency management agencies when hurricanes come in season to collaborate in coastal areas and cooperate in the disaster.
74. All Auxiliary needs improvement on Search and rescue training, rope rescue training, confined space rescue training, swift water rescue training, Fire fighting training, Hazwoper / Hazmat training, including all first responder advanced Training, Instruments and apparatus training, more advanced equipment, aircraft rescue and responding training, vessel rescue and responds training, general operations to advanced operations in disaster and emergency training with drills, a better Auxiliary website and programs for all auxiliary members.
75. Most instances where I answered "3" were not due to adverse opinion on my part, but due to lack of opinion on my part.
76. I am a new member and have not been exposed to any risks.
77. None
78. Safety is important, but it's not the only important thing when it comes to accepting and performing a task and/or mission. Many times, it appears that the auxiliary is perhaps too concerned with safety and, to use an old expression, "scared of its own shadow."
79. The Auxiliary should provide PPE for Vessel Safety Check Personnel as is done for Boat Crew.
80. Aux leadership response to safety issues varies significantly. Some leaders are more concerned with doing it their way and less with input from others on the team.
81. The senior officers want to push problems under the rug because they are friends with the offenders and then leave the reporters out in left field.
82. The culture is toxic. Don't speak up or there will be retaliation, innuendo, gossip, reputation savageing.
83. Survey asks for current duties; aren't previous duties important?
84. Regarding the power to cause change, I can initiate change by identifying an issue that has to be addressed. Actual ownership of implementation is often the responsibility of whoever receives the information I send. Therefore I feel I cannot effect change as I would on my own boat or plane.
85. NA
86. Would appreciate if every flotilla have trainings on safety or activities that promotes safety to get everyone/member familiar with the tasks and dangers that they need to be aware of and look out for.
87. Reporting of near misses - does it actually happen in any significant way, or is this just wishful thinking by leadership?
88. My sense is that, although safety is a priority, leadership is more concerned with the "optics" of safety than safety itself. What I mean by this is that they want to be seen as caring without actually caring or being invested in safety. I'm also certain that the culture of punishing those

<p>who cause mishaps or other bad outcomes, regardless of whether the person reported themselves or not, discourages people from being honest and proactive.</p>
<p>89. I'd have to research how to anonymously report a mishap. However, I don't really need to have or should have the option of being anonymous. It's important that whatever needs to be brought up happens quickly and with thought. Perhaps it would be easier if it were a group to bring up the mishap.</p>
<p>90. I believe our culture has become frozen by too much "legal" concern about safety..... The USCG Aux can barely due what is required because all the restrictions in place hampering the effective use of our courage and skills. I understand most of us are elderly and enjoy the fellowship but some of us (quite a few actually) would like to contribute to the safe and reliable rescue of our fellow mariners That is hard to do now because of the current distaste for risk at any cost. Just my opinion. NAME REDACTED Flotilla UNIT IDENTIFICATION REDACTED.</p>
<p>91.</p>
<p>92. In my district, the DSO,s have held their positions for years and do not take an active role in their activity. Others are not even qualified. It's not what you know, it's who you know. The same goes for some division SO's. There is no chance of bidding for one of the positions.</p> <p>Risk Management presentations need to be oriented to activities other than on the water. The Risk Management presentations from National need to be more relevant. It's always the same dull talking points without any examples. Do the developers have any experience in TCT?</p> <p>Lastly, the Auxiliary should focus on those areas that are really needed by the USCG. In our area, fire departments and Boat US do most of the on the water activities. Even if we are close by, we cannot assist.</p> <p>I've been a member for 23 years and really disappointed in the decline of the Auxiliary at all levels. We need to take an introspective look at who we are, what we do and where we want to go.</p>
<p>93. My answers pertain primarily to culinary duties</p>
<p>94. n/a</p>
<p>95. I have voiced an opinion on the lack of an elevator for handicap AUX to access our TRACEN. The division is aware of this need and the cost. Nothing is done at this time.</p>
<p>96. Better cold wx gear for aviators</p>
<p>97. I have been in the Flotilla for 23 years</p>
<p>98. What I do in the Aux does not require any PPE's.</p>
<p>99. We get safety training often.</p>
<p>100. Safety priority is key to successfully perform the duties of the AUX and active duty responsibilities</p>
<p>101. We need PPE in 3xl and above, also it would be nice if we had radios and equipment like the active duty small boat crews have ie ballistic vests</p>
<p>102. Disagree that CGAUX Aviation has a safety culture. I need to attend one safety meeting in person several states away once a year. Hear the same old charts read to me. Failure. How about a 15 min safety briefing about an interesting topic at every meeting? That's how you keep safety on your mind.</p>
<p>103. In my limited experience with Auxiliary 'leadership' I have found a general orientation to 'how it has always been done'...my example...as an FSO-VE I requested a PFD for use 'on and around the water'...I was advised "PFD's are only issued to certified Boat Crew" and found that statement to be supported on the District Webpage (but not by the OTO). In my view, the</p>

	SAFETY of Auxiliarists should be a primary consideration of Leadership decisions and have found MANY examples of 'that's the way it has always been done (translated to 'suck it up and move on')...in my view, this orientation represents the challenge between 'Chain of Command' mentality vs AUX 'Chain of Leadership' orientation (hope's?).
104.	have regular event training that we will use.
105.	The Everbridge texting can be annoying
106.	To a large extent I believe the Auxiliary safety program for experienced adults is a carbon copy of a program for CG recruits just out of high school. It is so much overkill as to be ignored by many. For some it is insulting.
107.	need better/more training on reporting of safety issues.
108.	I am a lifer Coastie (cadet, active, reserve, auxiliary). Per my positive answers above, I believe CGAUX safety and risk management climate is very good! However, to recruit and train diverse new younger members, CGAUX MUST streamline and improve training delivery. From 2012-2022, I took a 10 yr break from CGAUX membership and am now AMAZED at the bureaucratic growth of the dump truck load of CGAUX general required training in BQ, BQII etc. Auxiliarists have the same time constraint as reservists- we are all 10-20% part time, but with 100% training requirements as active USCG! I believe this issue is a big contributor to the significant strength decrease in CG Reserve and Auxiliary component member numbers since 9/11/2001. Online training delivery is significantly better, but CGAUX MUST continue to improve essential just in time education and on going knowledge delivery! Thank You!!
109.	I have been involved in 4 incidents during my career, I had a new crew person cut her hand with a pocket knife after a patrol, she was removing signboards from my facility and I was the Coxswain. She needed several stitches at the local hospital. It was reported, our OTO took immediate charge and cleared the way for the hospital visit. The reports went in properly, we debriefed and used it more as a lesson not a reprimand and I still discuss it with my crew and RM trainees. In a second incident our Coxswain slipped and fell off the stern of his facility while we were backing into his slip. Despite the serious danger our training kicked in and the helmsman knew to immediately shut down the engines but left it in gear. We pulled him from the water unhurt but very embarrassed. Again this became a training discussion. During another patrol training with a Coast Guard 45 we placed them in a side tow, another vessel passed at high speed and nearly shoved both vessels into the rocks. Quick thinking had both the Coasties and our crew immediately cut all lines allowing both vessels to maneuver out of danger. Once again this led to discussions about near-mishaps that I still use. Finally, after a patrol someone shot out one of the windows on my marked facility. We learned how to report the incident all the way up the chain, it was investigated and the damage repaired. I was thankful no one was injured, and happy the Coast Guard stood behind us.
110.	Policy changes affecting all are typically as a result of a few stupid occurrences, specifically, the removal of inflatable pfd's from use.
111.	Thanks for asking. Sometimes the upper leaders are too busy to train a new person.
112.	Always room for improvement
113.	Current Commodore , have. NO TRUST
114.	Leaders are very cognizant of teaching safety and expound on it.
115.	Stupid people make for stupid policies, and the Aux has not too bright leaders.
116.	Leadership knows of members who, by their current and past actions are dangerous to other members and they let them have authority. I know of women who have been horribly sexually harassed and they will not say anything because they will be treated like the bad guy. During a risk management zoom training one of these "leaders" who empowers a bad guy made

	several demeaning sexist statements. I said nothing because when I have tried to report to my Commodore in the past, he said I had to come forward and report the behavior publicly. There are CG events my husband and I will not attend because an Auxiliary member who is a felon is attending. No leadership doesn't care about my safety as a woman. My District is a good old boys club.
117.	Safety has been engrained since I've been in the AUX. and employed.
118.	I live in Montana and I am a kayaking and water safety instructor. We are still concerned that the USCGAUX has not established go or no go condition rules and safety requirements for inland paddlesports. Especially, kayaking rescue on rivers with current, winds, and cold water. Which is about every waterway we have in Montana. There is a great set of paddlesports regulations for the coastal regions, but they do not work for the types of waterways and weather conditions we have to work with everyday. I have been working on and off trying to get an inland paddlesport program going but it is still not there yet. The lack of a area specific program does limit us on when and how we can respond to rescues and search situations where the use of paddle craft are required.
119.	We had an incident on patrol where a crew member felt unwell. I think we should have terminated the mission or at least gotten medical attention for the crew member. The crew member just sat down and the patrol continued without significant damage but the incident could have turned out to be disasterous otherwise. Fortunately, the patrol was without any challenging incidents. Nothing was said about the matter following the patrol.
120.	Other than RM, there are not enough safety briefings or calling hazards to our attention.
121.	much of Aux leadership has little to no experience as boat crew, my observation
122.	Since all of the questions were very much slanted towards the answers you want let's discuss the paralysis by analysis culture of the auxiliary. You may have noticed that membership in the auxiliary is declining. One reason is that we are discouraged from almost all activities. Can't go in patrol, costs too much and too dangerous. Can't meet in person (for years) too dangerous. Can't get required training, online training only goes so far. Can't get uniform items because the gold side doesn't want us wearing the uniform (can't say I blame them). I can only speak for myself, but I miss the days when the auxiliary was given the opportunity to actively serve. Zoom meetings are no substitute for real world service.
123.	I believe that the CG AUX openly displays concern for safety. Annual TCT and other Risk Assessment training is "front and center" and treated seriously.
124.	My job as a comms watchstander does not require PPE nor does it involve personal risk so I left those blank. It would be better if the questions could first qualify the person taking this survey so if the member's duties do not involve risk then certain questions would not need to be answered. I have, however, taken the Risk Management Course and the annual refreshers, so I feel that I understand risks and methods to abate risks. This is excellent training.
125.	We always recieved special traing on safety. Excellent !
126.	When working at CG Sectors all PPE and work gear should be issued to volunteers, not just some of it.
127.	Senior leadership needs to understand what flotilla members encounter and provide a safe environment to discuss. I feel currently this does not exist in my district.
128.	Not confused
129.	In D11NR, we had severe storms and rain and wind that while that WX canceled our patrols, we still had members commuting to the harbor, we should have done a risk analysis and had them stay off the roads. I think a D11NR reporting of "near misses" makes for interesting monthly meeting briefings. For example, following a USCG AUX activity, I stopped for gas at an unfamiliar gas station and the hose had to be extended, I went to step across caught my foot and fell direct on my wrist and

	received a fracture and had to wear an arm brace for 3 months. I now walk around the hose to retrieve the squeegee.
130.	All good
131.	A year ago I would never have imagined myself saying this, but the Auxiliary should consider mandating the buddy system or two-person integrity (TPI) not only for operational missions, but for all other missions as well. Over the past 2 years I have worked many RBS related events, often by myself. With the state of today's world it is a wonder that I haven't come up missing at some point! Also, when I did have assistance, I observed that some of the older members had trouble walking, etc. Now what if that person had to work an event alone and happened to collapse? Sure help would come at some point, but wouldn't it be more appropriate to have another Auxiliary member present? Of course this might restrict some activities...but it might also increase member participation if two members were required to be present at every event. Just some thoughts...
132.	I am a retired safety professional. I have supplied much of my own safety gear - nitrile gloves, hardhat, high vis vest. Most of my shipmates have not completed Awareness Level HAZWOPER, even though it has been offered to them.
133.	Much room for improvement in qualifying and eliminating favoritism.
134.	I know of mishaps/near misses that people just turn their back on and don't want to get involved.....don't want to "if you see something-say something"....just keep your mouth shut and mind your own business attitude.
135.	I feel that the Auxiliary and the Coast Guard are involved and concerned about the safety of all its members. The one thing I think would increase members awareness about safety, mishaps and the reason for the Risk V. Award model would be to release more information on mishaps throughout the Auxiliary and Coast Guard. As with my time as a Police Officer, we would get real life examples of mishaps on a regular basis.
136.	I had to take some months off to deal with business and get my boats fixed. The leaders have shared links for me to train but the site lost hours of my online course so I decided to get back to it later.
137.	I sometimes feel "pushed" or "strong armed" into doing something that I know I can't or would struggle with.
138.	Good support. Always room for improvement.
139.	More training regarding safety dockside would be useful.
140.	I have appropriate PPE except a dry suit. The OTO says he wants members of the AUX to go out early in the season, the Sector Captain says he wants members of the AUX to go out early in the season... Up until now the OIC at the Coast Guard station has provided me with a drysuit so I could go out early in the season.... The current OIC refuses to provide a drysuit. When I ask why, he says. "I don't need you" . This is VERY frustrating! In order to be safe I need a drysuit so I can go out when the water temp is below 50 degrees.
141.	Throughout the year there is continuous review and overview of operational safety, situational awareness, and risk management prior to, during, and after all operations performed.
142.	I have been in the Aux for 21 years. I find it crippling to Recruiting and Enthusiasm when there is so much expanding administrative effort involved that takes away from our capacity to volunteer our time for our primary missions. I balance my desire to continue to serve as a volunteer against the ever increasing load of changes that keep getting in the way of our primary missions. With fewer leaders now, training up members to their various desired qualifications is harder than ever. Then when we think we have some semblance of stable qualifications, some young computer nerd dreams up something else that causes unnecessary changes and CONFUSION. My career with the Aux is almost used up and I wonder how the CG will ever be able to properly utilize such a volunteer work force that has been tied down with Admin and

	Boiler Plate Liability concerns, like this! If a member feels unsafe, then they need to be adult enough to deal with it. If they can't, then they are in the wrong line of volunteerism.
143.	Boat Crew safety is pounded in to us. The Covid mess was just that, rather than cancel, too many National things went on and caused problems for lots of us. Vaccination rules were dropped, why make rules and then not enforce them.
144.	Until we put up safety barriers such as an actual physical fitness and agility test with a completed Doctors Physical. I am afraid safety in the Auxiliary is a facade at best. Without actual written weight, BMI and agility limitations no amount of paperwork thrown out in the name of safety will fix safety issues in the Auxiliary. Placing the responsibility on the Coxswain to make a determination if a member is physically capable of performing or may be a safety risk due to the size of the person, is nothing but shifting the blame if an incident does occur. To many factors play into a Coxswains decision making process when excluding a member from an operational patrol. Though they may not admit it this question is in their mind. Is the fight worth it? Not only does the coxswain have to worry about the safety of the vessel and crew. They also have to contend with the ramification of what will happen if they do exclude a member. No body wants to be the bad guy. Depending how the situation is handled discrimination claims will arise. Regardless this does go through a coxswains mind and weighs heavy in the determination of letting a member go on patrol. How many times will a coxswain let a safety risk member go for fear of being called racist or claim of prejudice? Until actual detailed limitations are written that takes the burden off the coxswains the Auxiliary is not serious about safety.
145.	Nighttime patrols for Auxiliarists is an unnecessary risk.
146.	Many issues are overlooked or ignored. This I bring up never go anywhere and eventually you give up.
147.	I do not have all my PPE and I requested But they said that they do not have one
148.	Managing risk is getting to the point that we will no longer become effective as the leadership focus solely upon risk. Take the training wheels off. As adults we understand and assume risks in most every thing we do. I Feel it's more about the risk and less than about the mission.
149.	I take a CPR/ First Aid course every year at work. I believe the AUX should offer more CPR/First Aid courses taught by certified instructors.
150.	Over the last several years, it seems there has been too much focus on restricting activities to implement safety instead of training members and empowering them to make the right safe decisions.
151.	On the water and air operations activities are well versed in safety policies and procedures however other areas are woefully lacking in information
152.	We have many very senior Auxiliarist who have been around for years and are comfortable around many of the Auxiliarist they have been working with for 15 or more years which creates a "Good old Boy" environment where sometimes (not always) a blind eye maybe turned when someone does something that is not according to policy, or if a near miss or mishap happens, it may be swept under the carpet.
153.	I didn't answer most of the questions because I wasn't sure how to answer them. My primary role in the Auxiliary is to work on databases remotely. Outside of computer viruses and hackers, safety has never even been discussed and it's difficult to see what physical risks could occur from working on my computer. Although, I guess there's some risk to vision and possibly there could be consequences related to overuse of hands/wrists, but that subject has never been brought up.
154.	Just not really discussed.
155.	no comment

156.	Our local leaders are very hands-on and helpful. They are very safety conscious. I do not know where to find any written safety policies that may be available.
157.	I understand all aspects but am concerned that goldside often force controls in excess ie annual quals
158.	As an Occupational Nurse, I am acutely aware of the great safety culture in the Auxiliary.
159.	Every on water event is a unique experience. Some are similar to others, but many are new or rare. I am confident that we can deal with many events, but some could be over our heads. We are not doing this every day in all kind of conditions.
160.	My experience has been that risk management training is sometimes expeditiously presented in order to get on with other things
161.	Overall I think the Coast Guard Auxiliary has a strong and effective Safety Program and Culture. There are always ways and events that we can improve on.
162.	Coast Guard authority often overreacts to isolated mishaps that are not likely to be reproducible with current standards and training. This has a negative effect on timely reporting because the treatment is often worse than the illness.
163.	I feel that we are certainly provided with the necessary training and our flotilla and division leaders are appropriately cognizant of the process for assessing risk and benefits, but also how to make appropriate determinations for accepting or declining missions.
164.	Womenswear is too large for petite
165.	I believe we can never get enough training, especially when it comes to safety.
166.	I don't know why we are required to wear our uniforms to Flotilla Monthly meetings. We look too official to the idiots that are out to cause harm to Law Enforcement. We aren't law enforcement but do you think the one who may cause us harm know that? Why is it so important we have to travel to a meeting in uniform? Please respond to this question. Thank you
167.	The "senior member" mentality is still alive and well in the Auxiliary. Members who have been in for many years are given passes when it comes to procedures or safety and when reported to the COL, the reports are usually killed off at the Flotilla or Division level because this member has been in so long that they've "earned" a pass. Until this mentality is addressed and abolished from within the Auxiliary, safety will always take a backseat to Auxiliary politics.
168.	Very often, I still hear the old saying of "in the real world we would just do it..." or " the Coast Guard wants us to get the job done..." etc. There are a few people with this cavalier attitude towards safety. I've heard poor instructors talk about this in TCT training. There are people I will not instruct with, or do ops with because of this, and there is no way to report them or bring it up.
169.	Non-boat crew so the PPE does not apply.
170.	I'm a new member so I'm still learning protocols.
171.	Some Leaders place their friends in positions without having experience or merits
172.	Honestly, there too many old men that don't take pretty women seriously. Flotilla REDACTED UNIT if FINE, but I hav been in others when I lived somewhere else and the "good old boys" dismiss anything you say or suggest. Opportunistic culture is what I have predominantly seen. Even if you have experience in an area, you will be overridden by a man. Hands down.

173.	None
174.	All good
175.	<p>Aux Air has been a culture of Don't ask. Don't tell. When concerns are brought up to our immediate leadership, their answer is. "If you don't like it, don't fly!" When concerns are brought up in the presence of our OIA, we've gotten shushed. Our PPE is old and hasn't been inspected - EVER! Our Rafts have expired. Our Cold weather gear has expired. Members of our aviation district staff live a thousand miles from NY half a year, or in one case all year long! Many newer members don't know most district aviation staff because they've never seen them at our flotilla meetings. Group training is still via Zoom because the presenters live out of state. Morale is in the toilet because we've gone from 6-7 flights daily to, only recently, up to 5 flights weekly! Our members don't see or hear about what our leaders are doing to try to change this because, again, several live out of state and a lack of communication!</p> <p>With a severe cutback in operations, retention is failing, recruiting is nearly impossible. Our experienced members are aging out or removing their facilities from service. Unless something changes significantly Aux Air in our district won't stay an effective aviation unit.</p>
176.	comments related to future question on demographics: SECONDARY AUXILIARY FUNCTION - Marine Safety
177.	None
178.	I don't really need or use any PPE for the rolls. I carry out for the CGA.
179.	<p>I do the majority of the safety training and risk management training, so obviously I feel that I am capable and confident that I keep my members safe. I tell my members that there is always something that can be done to reduce risks and when looking in hindsight, there is always something that can be done to reduce/eliminate mishaps or injuries. However, higher levels of management, although very safety conscious, don't always appreciate the level of competency needed to keep all our members safe. Just meeting the minimum standards is not enough to ensure safety. Nobody plans to have a mishap and almost every mission we partake in has a low risk (or appears to be low) at the start of a mission. We tend to ignore that lack of proficiency will lead to more mishaps as the environment (not just the weather) changes after we get underway.</p>
180.	<p>Although I've been an active member of the Auxiliary for several years, my duties and interests do not involve active water operations. I've only been on a boat once. However, even a land-based Auxiliarist like myself needs to understand the basics of water and boating safety</p>
181.	<p>While I feel strongly on what I know and can do, I also do not feel that the membership is given clear guidance on safety as they should. Many times it is rushed through and not given the proper guidance for our membership that is needed. We need to be sure our members are aware of where the issues, dangers could lay in the mission they are working on. We owe it to our members to provide the most up to date information and training that we can. By giving members the needed guidance we provide a better trained member for the mission.</p>
182.	<p>As is quite common in today's culture and society, I find that many in the ranks of CGAUX fail and/or refuse to take personal responsibility for their actions/behaviors. Instead, there are a myriad of professed excuses and rationales expressed to dodge personal responsibility and accountability. Apparently, whenever and wherever possible, the next most popular response seems to be "ignore the problem or issue and, hopefully, it will go away". Whatever happened to Honor and Integrity?</p>
183.	The Coast Guard GAR system to evaluate risk to make informed decisions works simply and efficiently.
184.	Need to bring back PT if it was available
185.	my experience in one mishap I was involved in years ago was insulting and inappropriate. Believe me I no longer take any risks that I can foresee.

186.	More safety training and drills
187.	<p>Most, 90% or more, of all "safety" and "Risk Management" training, revolve around Surface and Air Operations. There is virtually NO education/discussion/training for Non-Operational RM and safety for the approximately 90% of CGAUX members/activities pursued by 90% of the membership in RBS (our "Job Number 1").</p> <p>Largest example are outdoor PA activities that occur in HOT, HUMID environments as well as cooler, wet/raining environments. By this I refer to the lack of HEAT INDEX training, lack of USCG provided PPE, or accepting a standard orange/blue/yellow... colored poncho's as few Auxiliarists can afford the \$164 foul weather parka, \$107 Trench Coat, which are the only "authorized" rain wear.</p> <p>I experienced a DCDR refuse to allow a special team of Auxiliarists, for a national level event that only happens once per year, prefer to cancel the event than to permit Auxiliarists to wear PPE in the form of identical color, weather protecting outerwear (so that uniformity was maintained).</p> <p>In the Tropical regions, the ODU material, even the shorts, are too heavy of a material to provide adequate evaporative cooling for the majority of our members (60 and more years of age). The AWU is the first uniform in my 15 years of membership that MIGHT be suitable for Tropical regions, but the 511 Tactical pants and shorts are again, too heavy of a material. Something like the Duluth Trading DuluthFlex Dry on the Fly Standard Fit Cargo Pants and shorts meet all the "similar to" 511 Tactical pants/shorts but are a much lighter material (rip stop) that allow for cooling of the wearer appropriate for our membership.</p> <p>The ODU material Tilly hat and Ball Cap are also too heavy for the tropical areas and even the Tilly hat does not provide any protection from the sun for the neck. None of the materials provide any UV protection. With the age of our membership, skin cancer is a major risk and proper protection from sun UV rays, as well as heat exhaustion/stroke risk are also elevated.</p> <p>I am sure the majority of flotillas in the cooler climates shut down most outdoor activities in the winter months and transition to indoor heated spaces, so this Heat Index and Heat Exposure issues are more a southern D7, D8CR, D11S, and D14 year round issue and seasonal for the rest of the Districts.</p> <p>The Active Duty have "Black Flag" days where this is unknown to the Auxiliary.</p>
188.	To have more safety training and exercise quarterly.
189.	I haven't been briefed on any safety policies or reporting procedures for near misses or mishaps during my time in the Auxiliary.
190.	I take all the safety/education training possible yet don't sail/patrol currently
191.	I am an OPS Officer and regularly complete GAR so feel comfortable discussing, measuring, and acting on Risk.
192.	I see complacency with few personnel. That is where the unexpected catches them off guard. We should expect the unexpected, think about what if situations.
193.	<p>2 years in the Auxiliary I have yet to hear any mention or written memos of any relevant "Safety Program". To use private and Govt. organizations' OSHA safety programs as an example, the AUX has none. I've witnessed an AUXFAC capsize and sink threatening my fellow AUX member's lives and have yet to see any official mention of the incident. In fact, the coxswain responsible for the sinking is still the DSO in charge of "Operations" and has had his new boat removed from missions for unsafe conditions. I'm appalled that this person is still allowed to be in charge of the program. Regarding the capsizing incident, no one was in charge, failed to use the ICS, failed to hold an after-action review, and absolutely nothing was mentioned about how to prevent this almost fatal tragedy. I personally don't believe the AUX has my safety as a priority. As a result, I don't participate in Boat crew activities. I see new boat crew members choose AUXFAC opportunities with coxswains who were responsible for repeated safety violations. Regarding near-misses and mishaps, my experience has shown that people make fun of those who fail to use PPE, going as far as awarding plaques. There doesn't seem to be any transparency of any safety violations, mishaps, identification of hazards, policies,</p>

procedures, training or leadership at the top or at the bottom of the leadership chain. In short, I don't have confidence that there is or will be any accountability for a "safety program". I would offer that what currently exists on the Directorate Safety page is an example of a cut-and-paste explanation of safety philosophy with over 1-2 dozen leadership roles resembling an ineffective organization with no accountability and transparency. Regarding training, there is a glaring lack of quality safety training used by state and federal employees available to the AUX. I'm concerned that what training will be similar to much of the current outdated AUX material presented only by bloated Power Point Presentations and poorly written multiple choice tests. Please ask for guidance and assistance from State and Federal OSHA organizations when you develop a program. Provide OSHA approved training for all members, most importantly require the top leadership to take the same training. Make a required list of OSHA course for all to complete. Award a "ribbon". Use table-top training for flotilla commanders what to do when someone is injured. Train people to investigate near misses and mishaps at the flotilla level. Be transparent. Have courage to share what went wrong with everyone. Make no mistake- designing, implementing and monitoring a safety program may be one of the most complex and important missions of the future Auxiliary. Strive to instill confidence in our missions and trust that someone has our backs. If CAL/Federal OSHA is required to protect workers, is the Auxiliary membership any different? Do we deserve anything less? There is more to my safety than my PPE and gobs of COVID related memos and attestations. Strive to find out where injuries and mishaps are occurring. Allow for anyone to use a simple APP to report hazards and incidents anonymously and quickly. Paper reporting is out of date. Keep track of reports and publish for all to see. Change the AUXFAC inspections from an equipment checklist to a more comprehensive "condition" report. If you can't see out of the dirty front window of the AUXFAC, there is something unsafe about the boat. If AYBC standards are recommended for the public boating, so should our AUXFACs. Should what the CG requires of water taxi's and 6-packs be any different than our boats? Lastly, when I examine other organizations who take responsibility for worker safety, there exist required first aid, CPR and AED training. I am appalled at the lack of this training in the AUX. It is 2023 and the AUX still does not have this training. Why? I don't have confidence in our leadership that my safety is a priority. I suggest being "bold" and set an example here. What do we have to lose if we don't train? In closing, I appreciate the opportunity to share my thoughts and look forward to results of the survey-If you have the courage to be transparent.

Thank You and Semper Paratus.

194.	We have numerous training sessions in risk management, and do GAR's before each Patrol where each individual has to speak up and comment on each section of the GAR. Emphasis is placed on noting changes in situational awareness, and discussing changes in the GAR
195.	I wish training was an ongoing and emphasized part of CGAUX on every level.
196.	More intelligent training is needed on every level in an objective rather than social manner. Having fun is for amusement parks and not the Auxiliary. Our jobs are very vital to the maritime world.
197.	WE ARE VERY WELL CARED FOR BY THOSE IN CHARGE AND WELL TRAINED BY THEM IN HOW TO CARE FOR OURSELVES AND OTHERS WHEN NEEDED OR PREFERABLY BEFORE.
198.	I have a unique position of responsibility and very high profile, so no anonymity for me.
199.	USCG too conservative during cold weather. Patrols were cancelled out of caution for aux, although crew had appropriate gear for water and weather temp conditions. This effected training time and gaining experience in cooler weather.
200.	I am motivated by this phrase safe boating class instructors use. We teach how to do something potentially dangerous safely.
201.	Page 8 has Professional misspelled.

202.	Experience is the best teacher. Many auxiliarists do not possess proprietary knowledge, in the field, to complete the tasks required.
203.	Leaders are open 2 listening, but using my chain doesn't always work as a good mechanism.
204.	Everything has been running smoothly.
205.	Sadly I will be leaving the Auxiliary soon. My experiences were not so great.
206.	We have an outstanding team, several retired Coasties
207.	Safety is preminent in all activities
208.	none
209.	Regarding Aux Leadership managing risk - far too many times we go too far. We try to make single policies that affect all auxiliarists the same way, when different groups of people don't have the same issues that are being addressed. COVID policies fell into this category, when Auxiliarists were locked down more severely and longer than the general public. And policies where, if one person screws up, all get impacted by new policies that make volunteering and serving more difficult. Operations, where we had to take PPE to CG locations for inspection, and had to do multiple times a year even though we are in colder climates and cannot operate from the fall inspection until the spring inspection are examples. Sure, years later corrections are made, but we overreact, causing needless extra work for members, in the meantime.
210.	The Aux leadership is tone deaf to their people and seem more concerned about stripes on their shoulders than actually caring about the VOLUNTEERS in the organization. Babylon is falling while they remain clueless and indifferent to why people are leaving and not feeling safe or able to be safe on the water. This group is an accident and lawsuit waiting to happen.
211.	The annual TcT and risk training is excellent but is aimed at boat crew. Those of us not in boat crew who are required to take it have a hard time connecting the dots to our missions. Tailor the training. A new commodore in my district is one of the most unsafe coxswains. He hot dogs it in his facility and I have stopped being on his facility for Paton patrols. He is arrogant. Those of us who aren't crew but must go on a boat to verify Patons are not given the same safety gear as crew. No eperb no sar vest. Totally unsafe.
212.	More training in first aid, CPR and equipment. Free of charge.
213.	Please, increase the amount of hands-on training. Too much time is spent on keeping our qualifications current. I.e. TCT / RM should not be done annually. As a volunteer I did not join the Auxiliary to be sitting in a classroom. My time is very limited, and the "GOLD" side needs to change their focuses from being politically correct to training for the specialty that I want to pursue. Perhaps, one of several reasons that we are having difficulties in retaining and recruiting is amount of time devoted to paperwork!!! AKA - KISS!!!
214.	R3 depends on type of emergency. R1 need access to eat protection
215.	Need 2 surveys. Air Ops have excellent Safety Culture, while Surface Ops safety culture is non-existent! Air gets all 5, surface ops 1-2. Third survey of leadership in general would get 3. Too much focus on minor stuff, too much nitty picky, personality games and cliques. Too many only care about egos/power, ignore or forget why we are in Aux. "Aux is our own worst enemy." "Aux, we eat our own young." These 2 statements I've heard for over 20 years now, are all too true. Higher up the chain, more politics is what matters. Need to focus on the "MISSION". Cut down bureaucracy! Stop reinventing the wheel! We're trying to get surface ops going again. Road blocks galore. Need multiple manuals to do one page of review questions in Qualification Guide. No power point program yet. Lot of questions like can we have other coasties sign off books? Swim tests? What are local OIA or Diraux requirements, what are they waving? How can we get underway training when no Aux vsl or coxswains/crew are available. 95% are REYR or now have lost quals completely due to not able to get on boat or not able to get a QE, literally,

for years!

Isn't getting Surface Ops back up and running in many areas a top priority? So where is your plan to get all those crew and coxswains requalified?

If you're sensing lot of frustration, you're correct. I tried calling Diraux office recently to get more info on a member for his obituary, who just crossed the bar. No joy. Reason, it was Monday. Nobody is in the office on most Mondays! Understaffed, underfunded, is months/years behind on awards, certificates, ID cards, etc, etc.

AUXDATA II, moodle, NTC, etc. Every time a new system comes along, it is LESS user friendly, not adequately beta tested or trained before goes fully active. CG new Financial system forgot Aux even existed. No budget, no line items for Aux Air, Surface, training or PPE. Active duty took a year of fixes for them to get it working. Feedback I heard was, it was not ready, not beta tested enough, should have been phased in gradually, so could find problems and fix it. Shut down old system long before new was ready. So no chance to use old system till fix new one.

Safety culture for Surface Ops, years ago I pleaded for a Safety Program like Aux Air has.

Tried to report via COLM, serious safety issues. Everyone I went to was aware and screwed me for bringing it up again. Repeatedly told to report to those who refused to do anything. It didn't change. Even after that coxswain had a major mishap. And the gold side Mishap Report missed that and other important facts. Root cause never addressed, culture of no safety culture still exists. Please make that another top priority! Thank you.

Please add a comment or clarification box at the end.

I have been elected FC, appointed many times to Div SO, ADSO, National Staff. Still do participate in multiple areas, so would need to check all choices if going back over one year. Have been recognized in past for a White Paper at CG Innovation Expo. For the last year or two, I have declined to accept any position as I consider my retirement from Aux due to the major issues and priorities as partially discussed above.

216. The Aux is very much still a good ol' boys network. Leaders at the District and National levels don't appear to be the least bit concerned about our or the public's safety. Reporting a safety issue - no matter how egregious or well-documented - results in harsh retaliation and the offenders excused. Safety in the Aux is a joke.

217. NOTE: NAME REDACTED

218. On occasion I have noted unsafe and relaxed attitudes on other facilities , mostly due to the age of the members onboard - but I have not reported , I did not have sufficient information - however a QE witnessed such performance - so I am assuming it was registered.

219. LOCAL LEADERSHIP IS UTTERLY UNPREPARED FOR AN EMERGENCY

220. Safety culture has greatly improved over the years.

221. No comment

222. I am an Auxiliary instructor. If I am provided with the appropriate curriculum I am ready to teach the classes.

223. As an Auxiliarist, I must also be aware of the safety of the public around me. PA events, PE classes, VEs, even PVs require ongoing awareness and training in public safety. This is a weakness and area of concern.

224. Nothing to add.

225. none of your questions, address, leader ship, making decisions based on being scared and taking the members own rights away.

226. we do not know what we do not know. The obvious is easy.

227.	No questions about response to concerns.
228.	My team always puts safety first and foremost before we start a patrol.
229.	If the USCG and DOT truly valued the contributions of the many volunteer auxiliaries, it would provide greater financial and physical assets. Our flotilla has only two private vessels for missions and therefore training opportunities are limited. The gold side should provide access to their resources. In the absence of such support, I can only conclude the Auxiliary is not valued. This circumstance appears to be at least partly responsible for reduced enrollment and interest by patriotic citizens who want to give back.
230.	N/a
231.	This is an exceptionally productive and meaningful survey. Thank you all.
232.	PE classes should include local emergency help seeking information.
233.	Training in my flotilla is basic and irregular.
234.	TCT needs to be stressed more than it is.
235.	None
236.	The questions could be answered differently depending on which coast guard aux skill you are referring to.
237.	I think the survey was well worded and easy to understand.
238.	OK
239.	Training weekly has made me much more confident about safely doing my job.
240.	All Good
241.	The Safety Culture in the Auxiliary, especially UNIT REDACTED is excellent. The coxswains are well trained, experienced, and assured. They make each mission one that is safe, well-planned, and properly executed.
242.	#C5 - How can someone feel confident about reporting a mishap anonymously when you are required to notify the OIA/OIC and leadership immediately and normally are requested to submit a report? #P1 - Finding any policy or information on any Aux website is a hunt and peck at best. Many times the links are broken or if you try from a CG computer they are blocked.
243.	I am happy to take and proud to report how well leadership deals with safety
244.	Must maintain effective communication one on one (1:1) between a Mentor and Mentee through out the training and after a mission to get a positive feedback. A proper standard (face to face / phone call) needs to be established between a Mentor and Mentee to have a good communication, atleast for 5 minutes to discuss any ideas to improve, which I see is lacking.
245.	As a retired U.S. Merchant Marine Captain and Marine Operations Manager of 42 years experience, Safety has always been of paramount importance to me. The Auxiliary should take steps to ensure that members that are physically and or mentally challenged by age or condition, be excluded from missions that require agility or situational awareness to avoid mishaps.
246.	Being a belt-and-suspenders kind of person, I appreciate the Auxiliary's emphasis on the safety of its members.

247.	Our OTO makes sure we have the proper equipment we need. As a Risk Management facilitator we have all the info we need to properly teach the class.
248.	There seems to be a disconnect within the Auxiliary regarding our mission and responsibilities.
249.	Can't think of anything to comment on specifically. "4" means I have a little uncertainty about the issue.
250.	The budget should supply AUXAIR with standard photo equipment.
251.	I have been a member of the CGAUX for 40 years now. In that time, I have seen the AUX. become an organization that is more concerned with paperwork than doing the job we started with!! We are told to train, train and train but when an emergency comes along are we called?? HELL NO!! I personally have been stabbed in the back and thrown under the bus by a person that did not have the backbone to come out in the open. Now I have dropped out of operations after 40 years of doing it without an incident! Also, to show how much we look out for one another I had no one at any level that had my back! Not even at District level! I am a volunteer and as such I do not need to be treated like this. Then add on all the current things they want us to do just to stay current in OPS and for what??? This is why the AUX is going down the tubes!!!
252.	The use of some of our Facility vessels is unsafe. Yes, these vessels pass inspections, but many are not crew-worthy, too small, low freeboards, unstowed gear, etc. Requirements for night hours adds to unsafe conditions also, especially for smaller vessels.
253.	As a Firefighter, I am constantly receiving safety training and support. But as an Auxiliary member, I often only hear about safety once a year or AFTER there is a problem. Continuing review and updates on safety is needed but not given.
254.	sometimes I feel we tend to downplay risk so as not to jeopardize the mission
255.	Nothing can replace experience, knowledge, and wisdom. As a USCGAUX coxswain, and a retired USCG licensed master for over 25 years, I assure you I take safety and it's training very seriously.
256.	The questions regarding an individual Auxiliarist's assessment of Auxiliary leadership capabilities is too broad. An individual Auxiliarist can know only the leadership with whom they come in contact
257.	Following appropriate safety procedures is given a high priority in my Flotilla, Division, and District.
258.	I have been in situations where some aux members try to impose their ideas about mission risk on others. Not how it is suppose to work but some members have an over inflated opinion of themselves
259.	we have very competent and knowledgeable leaders . my issue is auxdata2
260.	Yes its good
261.	Not all Auxiliary activities may be conducted safely (e.g., some QEs require a task be performed "by the book" even though the "book" task is not appropriate for an Auxiliary facility such as a 23' Center Counsel power book with a minimal foredeck). Most individual Auxiliarists know how to do things safely, just not always "by the book."
262.	It is overreach to expect volunteer members to report if they are involved in a mishap while in their private life.
263.	In the question with regard to "academic or professional safety expertise" The word "professional" is misspelled.
264.	I am retired from a career in the utility world where I worked for National Grid (power company). National Grids safety culture was second to none. The near miss reporting

	<p>procedures and safety procedures became a lifestyle for me and have kept me safe for my 58 years on this planet (the first few years, before I worked there I relied more on luck, not a good strategy). I couldn't be more pleased to see the USCG Aux adopt those same procedures. We will be better as an organization for it and our members will all be able to go home safe. Cheers to our leadership for adopting this approach to safety!!!!</p>
265.	I do not own ppe equipment due to not wanting to be on water.
266.	Finding information in the AUX is a challenge. There are multiple websites with multiple logins, with no unified index. Outdated information is often found on Flotilla, Division and District websites. This would be a monumental project, but a single repository of all policies would make life a lot easier for new members. Old ones, too, for that matter.
267.	There are some excellent Auxiliary leaders. Unfortunately there are also some very poor Auxiliary leaders and everything in between.
268.	Most Auxiliarists are over 60 years old. I see most of my crew having difficulty just boarding the boat. How useful will they be in real emergency?
269.	I believe that from my perspective leadership has been very responsive in insuring our safety
270.	In District UNIT REDACTED lack of PLBs
271.	Condition of the patrol vessel and trailer can lead to risks. Maintenance of vessel and trailer is many times ignored which I find unacceptable
272.	I would look to the Auxiliary manual; for most safety answers.
273.	<p>I have seen surface activities & new member retention affected by an absolute failure to provide PPE, especially PLB's in UNIT REDACTED. Both elected & appointed failed to follow through on requests. Aux units had to pay from their funds to have authorized dealers replace PLB batteries. New members commented "what kind of organization is this" and quit.</p> <p>At a time when CG forces are extended beyond normal (manpower shortages, etc.) why do some areas limit surface activities to Sept. 30, surely many facilities are large enough to brave the "severe cold weather" in early Oct. in UNIT REDACTED. Ex. after a shore-side mishap (never explained, heard someone tripped) all surface ops were threatened with immediate shutdown to 'review' RM principals. In other words some worry too much about our safety - we are not made of bone china and do not require bubble wrap enclosures. Talk to the rank & file about plans & working together.</p>
274.	While being boat crew, we should be wearing bump helmets in orange. Example, the tactical half helmet or the rescue swimmers helmet. I've seen many crewmen hit in head by equipment or other equipment on the boat. Excluding myself falling or hitting my head on the deck on night patrol. This should be made mandatory as PPE provided or purchased by crewmen, a crewwoman.
275.	Drills need to be conducted multiple times a year
276.	Recommend review of all questions and responses re this beta version as some questions didn't permit answering strongly agree(5), but rather only worked up to (4).
277.	It is frustrating that we receive conflicting information when there is a safety concern. During the recent hurricane, our local leadership told us we needed to be open. However the conditions were well beyond our parameters. It took contacting the Commodore in order for us to gain permission to stand down. Clear directives need to be shared regarding extreme weather conditions.
278.	My flotilla does everything to make sure all is safe
279.	I've been thrown into roles without training
280.	QUESTIONS SHOULD BE BASED ON MEMBERS EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING

281.	Very interesting questions!!!
282.	no comments
283.	Leaders often make decisions based on imprecise notions of "general safety," showing more concern for what those up the chain will think, then looking at the realistic situation at the local level. As a result, they are over-cautious.
284.	In all my missions it is obvious that safety is the prime focus.
285.	None
286.	No additional comments
287.	<p>I attended risk management training at a District conference this year. The 'instructor' told stories about how he took his facility out in "30 foot seas and 40 knot winds" all the time. That is your safety culture - that's an instructor at a safety event.</p> <p>We haven't seen or heard from our DIRAUX or OTO in more than 5 years (literally - we didn't know that the DIRAUX changed twice). Our AUX leadership is more focused on yelling at members whose name tapes are crooked than making sure we have life jackets that fit and PPIRBs that are newer than 2005 and have functioning batteries.</p> <p>I happily volunteer - but my active duty crew laughs when I remind them that I not only donate my time, but have to buy my own life jacket and SAR gear and purchase and carry my own PPIRB because the AUX one probably doesn't even work. Ask the RNLI if they make their volunteers buy their own gear and carry outdated and used kit.</p> <p>Buying my own gear is still better than when we got our SAR gear from the dumpster when the Stations get new stuff, but it's still wrong. And yes, my dry suit is 10+ years old, the USCG BM2 whose name is on it retired as a Chief, but his dry suit is still working.</p> <p>The only reason we haven't had more mishaps and casualties is because our optempo is down so much.</p> <p>PS - we will NEVER hear about this survey ever again.</p>
288.	<p>Training and TCT is good for operational activities but not certain outside of that venue everyone feels comfortable, confident and prepared to speak and confront issues that impact daily management of duties and activities.</p> <p>Would be good to have a safety form on forms page to report incidents or accidents anonymously no matter what the activity.</p> <p>COL does a good job of promoting safety and training but unless everyone is familiar and committed to situational awareness from initial enrollment, beginning of auxiliary experience to understanding culture of devotion to duty means devotion to safety, risk management, educational TCT measurements/initiatives daily to ensure mission effectiveness.</p> <p>The suddenly in command was a good initiative and more tradeoffs like this are effective in all approaches of auxiliary business models to help members comprehend its importance.</p>
289.	The RM-TCT training is excellent and a valuable annual practice that reminds us of the risk that we could face and how to deal with them. I think it should be a regular practice, as a training moment, to consider potential risks during patrols and what the crew would do to deal with the risk.
290.	PPE, particularly PLB's were very late coming

291.	Some questions are too broad or “opened ended”. Not all members have the same tasks or jobs. The culture of safety is for all in the Auxillary.
292.	Oversight by cg over leaders of Aux would add a level of confidence. Sometimes leadership at the Aux levels are based on a popularity contest or time served by those not trained in proper leadership. Leadership courses are available and should be mandatory, both to assure our leaders are qualified, and to lend credibility to the aux. We are volunteers willing ready and with oversight regarding training, we would be able. Recruit and retain individuals who are merely breathing lends little credibility, as does time served by those without Leadership training to encourage the truly interested. Its discouraging to know uneducated or untrained are running a show for their benefit but not the best interests of individuals volunteering to be force multipliers for honor, respect and devotion to duty.
293.	Perhaps more details differentiating between a "near miss" that should be reported due to implicit safety concerns vs one that, while interesting, has little to no safety risk.
294.	There exists a dual standard for safety in the Auxiliary. Those members who hold positions of leadership are not held to the same safety standards as members. I have personally witnessed this from my own experience in the Auxiliary. There are members of the Coast Guard and Auxiliary who lack experience in some aspects of safety and who are not willing to learn from others with more experience. Because someone holds office or rank that does not mean they are knowledge in certain areas of safety. When policy and procedures are are written, members of the organization who have skills and knowledge in that subject area should be included be included on that committee.
295.	No comments
296.	no additional comments
297.	There was a single event that occurred and was seen by active duty CO and was not handled appropriately. Threw in a lot of questions in my mind about this very subject and how it is viewed individually, the process was not properly followed in discussing the event.
298.	I have been a police officer for 40+ years and know what preparedness is. I have also been a volunteer member in various organizations and find that the USCG AUX is top notch reference safety. The organization as a whole is excellent with information, training and leadership in the area of safety and preparedness.
299.	I have always felt comfortable with leaders concerns for members safety in any of the areas i have experience in.
300.	Regarding question C-5, I am not sure how one would comment anonymously. If it is covered in the Safety Organization documentation, I sure missed it. I guess an unsigned letter in an envelope with no return address and mailed from another Zip Code would be anonymous. Regarding question L-3, in my 19 plus years in the Auxiliary, serving as the Radio Operator (TCO) for Surface Operations, I sit in on the pre-mission briefings and the Coxswains stress the risks and safety concerns for the mission. I do not remember any specific safety related training for the overall Flotilla membership such as at meetings.
301.	Near miss: Observed but not reported; A crew member jumped to the dock from the boat without the Coxswains permission or awareness.
302.	“Near miss” is unfamiliar to most Auxiliarists and few would stop what they are doing to focus on it, much less report it. To have a culture that encourages it seems to me to demand a different pace and much less urgency than is common with the teams of which I am part. I have never known even a “mishap” to command our attention for long. To report a mishap would be unusual
303.	Knowing what to do and doing it are two different things. We have training but do we ever use that training? The Auxiliary used to be a VOLUNTEER group to help boaters in distress on the water and teach children water safety. Today, we are changing towards being a RESERVE rather than volunteers. Telling us we have to have perfect uniforms doesn't make us

	<p>more safety conscience. And with more and more hours to stay qualified, it takes away from being a volunteer. We can do more by being a civilian than an Auxiliarist.</p> <p>We need to return to the true definition of VOLUNTEER: To do something, esp. for other people or for an organization, willingly and without being FORCED or paid to do it.</p>
304.	There are a few places in the Aux where safety is taken seriously like AuxAir. The average Aux member receives no safety training
305.	Although safety procedures are in place their compliance is very inconsistent- many times just for show
306.	Aux Leadership especially at the Flotilla level has very little concerns about Safety. Division level is concerned. District & National level is very concerned. I served at all levels during my 20+ years.
307.	Thank you for asking. I have more questions than answers.
308.	Thoroughly enjoy supporting active duty in any. Galley & keeping boat paddle craft owners safe in any waterway!
309.	Flotilla is not friendly. Abusive and disrespectful.
310.	Some coxswains are not always open to disagreement in the GAR
311.	Several Axillary members that I have been on missions with and other recreational boating safety activities are in there later years (70s 80s) and do not recognize their declining physical and mental abilities. The Axillary does not evaluate these individuals that are often in leadership roles and take appropriate action to rectify the problem. It is a accident waiting to happen and the Axillary needs to take some action, such as physical and mental fitness tests.
312.	The issue that keeps coming up is we discuss risk and run through training around events where members fitness for the duty is a definite factor, then continue to put individuals not fit for duty into operations if there is sufficient members present as minimum.
313.	Some Auxiliary activities such as vessel examiner need more safety training. Larger vessels can have risks that are not fully covered in the training. Enclosed spaces, leaning over the side and more.
314.	Some folks are slow to recognise when something is going wrong, and fall back on hierarchical structures and try to bull or bluff their way through a worsening situation or simply go silent as bad situations develop unimpeded. People with non-CG military backgrounds tends to be especially susceptible to this.
315.	I feel we get an adequate amount of safety relevent to our duties
316.	n/a
317.	Prior to covid, I was doing patrols regulary and I believe I knew what I had to do in the case of a mishap. However, I have not been on a patrol since 2019 so I don't think I now have the ability to report mishaps or near mishap.
318.	My Primary activity with Auxiliary is with the active duty EMFR, but I am also a Coxswain and an Instructor so cover all but Aviation
319.	I feel as a flotilla and a boat coxswain myself, that we strive to adhere to the highest standards expected of us by our Gold side (USCG) counterparts here at our local level. However I feel that we get little to zero support at our district and division level, and if we do it's usually confusing and will not pertain to our operational goals again at the local level.
320.	Why does the survey say "Test Beta"?
321.	I served 28 years active duty and joined the Auxiliary after I retired as a BMC. The AUX greatly added to my unit safety when I was the XPO of STA REDACTED UNIT when we stood

	port and starboard duty with only 6 people assigned and again on 911 when I was the XPO of STA REDACTED UNIT. I see that just recently active duty experience can be taken into account and that is good and I'd also like to see the currency requirements lightened up because I dropped my COXN qual when I was told that I would have to go through the full requal process again because mine had expired... In some instances our safety requirements are overkill...
322.	during patrols and training missions who is in control..otw
323.	I think there should be more clarity when there is an expectation that a member will report a "near miss". Was the near miss actually avoidable? Did the near miss occur as a result of failure to follow procedure or even common sense? Will our Leaders lead by example by reporting their own near misses? My point is, we should avoid asking our members to do something they are likely not to do. It starts a bad trend.
324.	Funding for more C-Schools are lacking. Personnel with appropriate skills needed to maintain training and readiness are insufficient.
325.	I have done the best I can with the survey based on previous experience in the Auxiliary. I have been inactive for the past several years and would not be useful as a boat crew member because of age related abilities.
326.	Safety is important and it's pushed by leadership, but all too frequently purely for liability concerns, even when the risk is minimal. The paperwork, constant training and the CG ambivalent attitude towards the AUX has driven me to give up on some activities. Sometimes I feel like quitting.
327.	Even though we don't have an official safety officer, I've taken all the required training both written and actual physical.
328.	I agree that safety is paramount. The Aux needs to be careful that the drive for safety does not curtail activities. There is risk in everything we do...in and out of the Aux. Each of us (members) needs to be comfortable in making that decision. And I am. So I don't want leaders that second guess after an event/incident....when time and information are plentiful. Ie...second guessing after the fact.
329.	As an Aux in a leadership position when instructing I place a big importance on safety. Of course, the result is dependent on an individual's adherence to the safety precautions. It is important that the Risk Management program incorporates more scenarios than just surface operations as has always been the case. There is much more to the Aux activities than just boating operations. PLEASE NOTE: The AUXFS designation was replaced by AUXCA 2 years ago. Your next question indicates AUXFS and needs to be corrected! Thank you.
330.	As boat crew I believe the 2 Coxswains in my flotilla practice and expect all ops to be done within USCG and AUX safety expectations
331.	I have been a member for about 6 months and I am still learning a lot from the Auxiliary.
332.	Not long enough as an auxiliarist for a proper comment
333.	Question C4 is too vague. Reporting mishaps requires judgements. For example, if a knife slips when working that that slip could have resulted in a mishap if not for other mitigating safety protocols in place, should that be reported? Too many reports of relatively insignificant potential mishaps has its own sets of problems. Question in the Rm section: The use of the word "leaders" is too non-specific. For example, the leaders teaching RM are usually only a small subset of those leaders within competencies or elected/appointed. I would answer the Rm questions differently for different types of leaders within the Auxiliary.
334.	Our RM sessions strive to cover most situations and we regularly review these concerns as part of regular AUXCA updates and training.
335.	I feel like safety is a top priority in my unit. Everyone is safety oriented and place it at the top of the list. However I do think there should be a higher emphasis placed on first aid and CPR

	in the Coast Guard Aux. I fee like maybe there is a room for medical professionals that are volunteers to maybe teach first aide and other things . Maybe another job in the Auxillary .
336.	I'm not sure what you mean with the "empowerment" questions.
337.	This survey is deeply flawed in its construction. Using the generic "auxiliary leadership" makes no distinction among flotilla, division, district and national levels. Likely this is not an oversight. My responses are based on my new flotilla leadership and do not reflect my opinion of the prior flotilla, division and district which would be less favorable.
338.	No thank you
339.	I agree that safety is very important, but at times, it has been over emphasized beyond what is reasonable.
340.	I am confident if I report a safety issue to a leader within my flotilla it will be taken seriously. I am less sure how to report a safety issue officially as in who to contact.
341.	I was not aware that there is an Auxiliary safety policy. I have been an active member for 15 years.
342.	Safety and risk management has been at a high level with aviation and RBS, from my experience. Please offer an anonymous survey on D&I culture.
343.	The USCG has become safety paranoid. A mishap happens and the whole Auxiliary pays for it.
344.	Survey does not really apply to my flotilla because we do not participate in boat crew or any events that would put us in harms way.
345.	No 'safety' training at flotilla level; no safety issues observed at any event.
346.	Regarding surface operations, we have a fundamental issue with the process of mentorship. Boat crew members who are training are not necessarily instructors (by skillset) and training often falls short in the zeal to get folks signed off on their PQS.
347.	1sr has a huge shortage of QE. I work during the week so I can only get recertified is during the weekend. Major problem finding a QE. USCG are not allowed in my area to sign off Aux crew and Cxawains.
348.	Many in the surface ops talk about rm but do not follow the principals of rm many in ops should no longer be in program but find ways around to get thru the qe process. They get a friendly active cg to sign off the 3rd yr currency without doing all the tasks
349.	Hard to imagine how tis will be useful if everyone else say's I know about safety and leaders don't or could care less. The policy is ...????
350.	In my particular duties as an Auxiliarist, (HSO,PV,SO-FN) I am not exposed to any real physical risk. I have not even been on the water in several years. And so, other than ordinary concerns such as using caution in climbing or descending stair cases, driving safely and being aware of my surroundings, i do not really thing of safety. I am interested in risk management as a management topic and our division spends a great deal of time on this subject. If i were on boat crew, then i would be much more safety conscious because at sea things can go wrong quickly.
351.	I need to take this opportunity to inform aside from specific questions in this survey. It is an honor and a privilege to serve with team USCGAUX. However, it has been an unusual challenge to serve in my flotilla this year, due to the actions of one particular flotilla member. The problem is clear to me, as well as to most of the leaders in my flotilla, that this is due to the fact that I am female and that this particular male flotilla member has an ego that enters a room before he does. I know that I can only control my own behavior and not his. At this time, I am seriously not safe. Sadly, the best action I can take to mitigate the situation and be safe, is to scale back all of my own activity. I plan to continue to serve in capacities that do not involve in-person or phone call interaction with this flotilla member. All communication will need to be in writing, via email or possibly text message. Though the member has an enormous ego, he also

	has incredible skills, past experience (including prior military), knowledge and the very real potential to do great things in the CGAUX. My hope is that by my stepping aside for a period of time, maybe he will shine and do the right things for the good of the CG, the CGAUX and for the good of the general public we serve.
352.	I am a member and waiting for training
353.	On the water activity has inherent risks that may or may not be alleviated by all kinds of rules and regulations
354.	I feel like I am not empowered to assess risk because Leadership tends to be more risk averse than my "default."
355.	I had not been exposed to risk management training and principles in decades of doing other jobs except the CGAUX. I have not seen other members accident claim or injury reports (like the OSHA 300 forms) and therefore can only speak from my experience in the CGAUX which may or may not be the same as the claims/accidents/injuries of the other thousands of members.
356.	As a leader we recognize members perceive risk differently. You have members that are very risk adverse and will call into question even when performing regular tasks. Others think getting the mission done is job one and willing to take great risk to complete the mission. On another note, it seems like as an Aux member we can't make any mistakes or mishaps otherwise we create a negative impression by Active Duty. One is put through the ringer. We are not perfect and I will also say Active Duty is not perfect either. They regularly have mishaps perhaps at a greater level than we do. Everything we do has risk so let's accept stuff happens, learn from it and move on...but don't create a whole new set of policies and annuals to punish all...before there will no longer be "all" to punish...but I am 100% behind and the promotion of a Culture of Safety.
357.	overall, the Auxiliary needs more safety training. monthly would be good.
358.	Some of questions elicited answers that were independent of the Auxiliary.
359.	I am disappointed with the approval process & system for requests, staffing, communication and funding of flotilla request for on the water training for boat crews/ coxswains. Our flotilla or coxswain(s) have been denied/ or their requests for boat crew training or coxswain training has been slow-walked to result in training (crews left hanging as to approvals/ funding, or delayed approval of OTW training - due to what we heard were personnel changes at D7 Aux level). Our flotilla turns in requests to conduct training, then followed by periods of no communications which resulted in crews being left hanging with our notification of approval of OTW training. Flotilla boat crew morale has suffered, and our fairly strong OTW program has dwindled to a mere ghost of itself. It seems that other flotillas have had their OTW training approved, but our have been lost in the system! There seem to be too many personality issues in the approval process.
360.	A culture of safety has been supported over the years in the auxiliary
361.	Our yearly risk management is something that could be done online! The Auxiliary overkills quite often!
362.	Good survey.
363.	Safety is expressed daily in our duties whether it be boating activities, PA events, Vessel exams, or other related activities which a mishap could occur. In our business Safety comes first
364.	My response may seem a bit "over positive" however I am prior USCG enlisted and then worked in a very safety conscious industry (construction management). A final caution, safety is not "job one" as often touted. No activity is without a level of risk, there has to be a balance of safety vs. goal.

365.	My personal opinion for new members should have someone to take them by the hand since sometimes there are many processes to do to just be BQ and sometimes they take many exams to qualify but because they do not have any requirements the processes are delayed
366.	With the training we receive I am very confident in my ability to handle hazards and emergency situations
367.	The RA training is generally for Boat Crew. We are required to have it in the CA arena. We have members who have a history (decades) of being First Responders, yet they have not been recruited for TCT Facilitators.
368.	<p>The update to the aviation Policy manual and training manual introduced subtle changes that I don't believe were fully vetted and may reduce our level of safety. For example, The Policy manual now allows single engine aircraft 50 nm offshore (Ref Auxiliary Operations Process Guide: Volume II – Air Operations, Chapter 7: Conduct of Aircraft Operations, Page 7-22, E.1 General). the increase from 25 to 50 is a considerable increase in risk.</p> <p>Also the new requirement for First Pilots and Aircraft commanders to maintain night currency actually increases risk by requiring more single engine night flight. The emphasis should be on instrument currency but that is not a requirement for First Pilots which increases risk. Ref 16798.5A Auxiliary Training Handbook – Aviation, Chapter 4 – Currency Maintenance, Page 4-5 B.1.All Pilots,</p>
369.	There are members of the auxiliary that are in leadership roles that place themselves, their facilities and other auxiliaries at risk with unsafe behaviors.
370.	As a long-time coxswain, I am very focused on ensuring the safety of my crew members, my vessel and the public we serve. I ensure we evaluate risk vs. gain during every mission. Unfortunately, our leaders at the flotilla, division and district level do not demonstrate the same level of commitment because rarely do we discuss member safety at those levels....unless there is a major mishap. Then, it is too late.
371.	None at this time
372.	Thank goodness for TCT! I have been AUX 19 years and find our Sector Leadership wanting when promoting safety. It's presented as a "if you don't do this, you can't participate in these activities." Better to present safety in a more positive light. Add to that, Auxiliaries who are Container Inspectors have different safety concerns than Coxswains/Crew. Safety could be presented/taught such that emphasis be placed on safety as it relates to an Aux PQS v/s a "one flavor for all" approach. Thanks for presenting this!!! #MEMBER NUMBER REDACTED
373.	There needs to be more training, yearly on safety, especially for newer members of the auxiliary.
374.	In my flotilla, division and interaction with the Provincetown Station personnel, continual training is emphasized which includes safety training for all operational activities and includes regular inspection of PPE equipment
375.	Response from USCG with funding to correct or improve safety is challenging
376.	I have found that Leadership has the equipment, training, and experience to provide a safe environment. It is my experience that members that are less engaged and motivated become their own worst enemy in not getting properly trained in how to correctly operate in a safe manner, or how to speak up when a situation may become dangerous.
377.	<p>the explanation of the process for transitioning PPE checks from active duty to auxiliary has been poorly organized and communicated.</p> <p>problems exist within my area of non professional expertise and have been repeatedly forwarded up the chain to National. There is often no response to forwarded concerns. If pushed the response is 'they are 'working on it' but YEARS pass without resolution. . Suggestions to correct problems are met with hostility.</p>

378.	PLB's not made available do to upper mgt. screwup
379.	When a Commander is asked to give an answer on a request that falls under the duties of a staff officer. Said staff officer should be brought into the conversation. This will allow the Commander and staff officer to have a conversation. This will allow a mutual agreed upon answer be given to the request.
380.	Interesting thought provoking questions re: Safety in USCG AUX
381.	Aux uniforms do not include effective footwear for snow/ice. For Aux meetings, my flotilla offers zoom attendance in addition to in person, so that is a good option in inclement weather. Not all missions can be covered remotely in winter, though.
382.	Safety training and top of mind awareness is work in progress with continued effort needed.
383.	I feel safety measures and proper reporting by my Flotilla has declined terribly over the years. Training is now subpar and there is no one to be able to report this to. The appropriate trainers have not been allowed to do proper training and insufficient training is done by incompetent personnel. Paperwork is also fudged and sent in. Our operations totally have declined and are subpar. This should be investigated and corrected for the safety of new recruits as well as experienced auxiliarist crew.
384.	Always seems to be asking the wrong questions.
385.	Need new Pers EPIRBS none forthcoming
386.	As a relatively new Auxiliary my mentor NAME REDACTED has done a wonderful job instilling a culture of safety and provides excellent training
387.	Leadership is reasonable
388.	<p>Much of my team's safety-related ability is due to skills I brought when I joined the Auxiliary, not skills learned in the Auxiliary.</p> <p>We have extensive policies and procedures intended to make everything we do safer but the amount of material is so large that it becomes functionally unusable. A summary guide would help.</p> <p>Training opportunities are limited for those of us not located close to large flotillas or active duty units. Efforts to become qualified to offer training are ignored. As an example, I applied to become a TCT/RM facilitator nine months ago and, despite multiple follow up efforts, have not received an answer.</p>
389.	In the last few years, the rules put in place because of dumb mistakes made by a few burden the members that have been contently safe.
390.	Safety in the galley (either underway or in a station, but especially underway) is not seriously emphasized by AUX leadership. I have previously brought up an issue and was dismissed by leadership, but still feel it is important to address. There are AUXCAs who are assigned to cutters who are not physically capable, but self-attest that they are. They report to the cutter, then sent home due to their condition. This costs the CG time and money, and denies another AUXCA the opportunity to serve. When the cutter requests a medical exam beforehand, it should absolutely be done, not by a GP but by the Coast Guard Health Services, who understand the cutter environment and the dangers being underway on the the high seas present. Yes, we had an exam in order to qualify for AUXCA, but that might have been years ago, and things change.
391.	All safety training is focused to boat crew including annual TCT refresher. No consideration to radio operators, VEs or other positions that require you to be working out doors or in public. TCT is good if you are with a team, but what about if you work alone?

392.	The definition of leader may not be consistent in all answers to the survey. I believe that my flotilla leadership is much more aware and responsive than, say, in my division or district... or at national. I am active in surface ops and yet have had to purchase some of my own PPE to ensure that it is available to me. We use personal vessels which, while they pass the required annual inspection, are neither built nor designed for the tasks that we are asked to perform; for patrols, we're fine, but not necessarily for a SAR, towing, or emergency response. USCG gets rid of patrol boats all of the time and USCGAUX can't even bid on them; this is ridiculous that CGAUX has no access to surplus or moth-balled USG small boats. And this is a safety issue!
393.	Safety and risk management should be discussed at every Flotilla meeting.
394.	I felt totally disrespected and physically distraught about being removed from an ADSO position on the complaint of 1 person who had been in reyear for 2 years and NOT having been given a hearing. I wrote a letter/ e-mail explaining what happened several times but because the complainant was a close friend/ acquaintance of the officers in charge, a hearing was refused. That is not making a safe work environment for me. I put in many, many hours in that job and I was humiliated.. Why should I trust and respect senior officers like that? On the other hand, I now have a life because I needn't put in so much time. Thank heaven for the active duty with whom I work and who totally respect me and my work ethic.
395.	Would still like to see more interaction between the gold side and silver side when it comes to safety culture and raising the expectations on the silver side to be inline with Team Coast Guard.
396.	Relevant required training on safety matters, such as boat crew training, are very difficult to get signed-off due to severe shortage of volunteer mentors and QEs. The circumstances required for a sign-off are also unnecessarily restrictive. For example, demonstrating safe anchoring must be done on a patrol while under orders. This is not really necessary, and could be appropriately and safely performed on a mentor's vessel while not under orders. The combination of unavailable personnel and unreasonable conditions placed on sign-offs means that training does not take place.
397.	I feel that there are times when protocols are not followed, hardwired ECOS, coxswain staying at the helm, and safe speeds for conditions and I am not able to be assertive without repercussions.
398.	Funding is hit and miss for PPE based in USCG budgets Most operational missions have strong safety controls in place .
399.	Regarding Surface Ops - Foul weather clothing (suitable rainwear) s/b included in PPE (either provided by the CG/CGAux or standards established for individual purchase)
400.	My flotilla has become largely inactive since the covid shutdown, as have many others in my area. Attention should focus on revitalizing the organization. It's difficult to think of safety when we are barely functioning.
401.	We need to develop the District Safety Specialist Program
402.	We need to think more about security at the places we work and perform our activities, for instance. Never do any activities singularly, always have another person with you. We can be more situational aware this way. Next we need to consider the location safety of activities more. If we're always running safety checks at the same boat ramp the same daw of the week, we are making ourselves a bigger target because we have become more predictable. Take care as to the arrangement of the activities' locations, such as trash cans, newspaper boxes, these can be booby trapped with explosives. Location of activities in regards to elevated positions such as bridges, grain storage towers and buildings, these can be used as shooting positions as well. There is much we should be taking into consideration that we aren't
403.	The Auxiliary is largely older people. The Auxiliary displays large Coast Guard placards while on patrol. I think both our members and the public at large would be better served if we required CPR training and equipped our patrols with CPR equipment (and AEDs). I believe the public's expectation from a vessel bearing Coast Guard markings would be to have a crew

	<p>capable of providing CPR/AED assistance. I recommend that we conduct compressions only CPR training to reduce the risk of infection to our members AND to increase the number of members willing to participate.</p> <p>I suggest that we establish a Flotilla Staff Officer-Safety. Safety is part of our training but a safety officer could coordinate safety related training, and the acquisition and distribution of PPE (other than boat crew specific PPE) such as blood borne pathogens kits, etc.</p> <p>We should require boat crew members to carry on their person gloves or a bloodborne pathogen kit.</p>
404.	It is almost impossible to report things anonymously. All near misses do not need to be reported and corrective action can be accomplished locally. Feedback is not always accepted or encouraged. These are my experiences in 20 + years of AUX membership.
405.	While not absolutely perfect in all things in this area, I am comfortable knowing that the Aux takes risk mgmt and situations seriously, and works to continuously improve these situations in a sometimes highly-evolving environment.
406.	The US Coast Guard Auxiliary is one of the finest institutions available as a volunteer. The members are incredibly dedicated and schooled in their respective areas.
407.	New Member, so not a lot of personal experience with USCG Aux yet
408.	Leadership still wants to punish for incidents.
409.	I have learnt valuable skills from being a Mbr of CGAUX which has helped in my line of work. NAME REDACTED in particularly has been adamant and thorough with safety and skills. Thank you
410.	I have less than a year in the Auxiliary, however, from life experiences I have confidence in my relevant abilities to communicate in what I've seen as the Aux culture.
411.	Many Boat Crew members do not have all of the mandatory equipment ie pperbs batteries are out dated and we are not given replacements
412.	None
413.	Leadership knowledge varies greatly between individuals, lots of book knowledge but not necessarily real world experience. I do believe safety is on the forefront of everyone's mind while conducting operarions.
414.	Leadership sometimes assumes auxiliary members are "guilty" before hearing/understanding the circumstances around an incident (other than mishap or accident)
415.	With the anti western civilization, anti Christian, and antisemitism/Jewish environment increasingly under ideological attack plus our open boarders; military policies keeping our service members unarmed shows lack of leadership understanding risk. The WOKE environment permeating our military is killing recruitment and retention.
416.	None
417.	At a local Auxiliary level, while I believe that coxswains are very concerned about the safety of their crews, I periodically see shortcuts in the Risk Management process. This shortcut doesn't necessarily include the Team Coordination Training, but more ship-board, such as the pre-underway checks, and vessel-specific (Facility) training. This training is improved through repetition and crew familiarization, not just with the elements of a vessel, but with each crew member. Even if a crew member is familiar with a vessel, getting underway with a different team each time doesn't give you an understanding of the strengths of each crew member which compromises safety. I would like to see more emphasis on "Crew Member excellence".
418.	I'm a recent transfer from Division REDACTED UNIT to REDACTED UNIT. Went on my first MOM Patrol in Division REDACTED UNIT. It was VERY different & unsettling. No GAR was

	performed. No brief as to crew duties. No rotation of duties over 7 hours of patrol. Room for improvement!!
419.	My concern is mishap in respect to reporting is not well defined. It could be more gripes are submitted that errors. The current risk management training is well thought out. However if you want to track this ...
420.	I feel confident that the Auxiliary has my best interests at heart.
421.	I am Air Observer in CG AUX aviation. AUXAIR has a STRONG emphasis on safety, crew resource management, safety training, etc.
422.	FYI Professional is mis-spelled on page 8 of this survey
423.	The annual OPS workshops tend to repeat the same material year after year, i.e., cover points of RM when everyone in OPS also has to complete an annual RM workshop. There are other equally or more relevant topics that could be covered in the workshop. Operational safety of AUXFACS would be enhanced with a chartplotter that the coxswain and crew know how to use, but they aren't required, only charts are required. There is no method to anonymously report a near miss. The station, the OTO, DSO-OP, SO-OP will know who you are; depending on who the person is, you may face 2nd guessing. When something occurs there is a tendency to apply corrective action to everyone vs. just those guilty of the error/offence. A good case could be made that crews engaging in patrols in an urban area or helping to enforce a safety zone in an urban, high traffic area should wear bullet proof vests. An irate boaters or one who has a problem with law enforcement in general may only see orange and blue, the words Coast Guard, when they are asked to leave an area and decide to react violently. My crew has had one occasion of verbal abuse, from a boater who eventually became the subject of a CGIS investigation. D9 has operating limits for AUXFACS based on size and equipment, i.e., radar, this was done for safety over 10 years ago, but we're a national organization, why isn't there a national standard? Saying it is up to the local jurisdiction invites inconsistency and is an area where there should be national leadership.
424.	A direct office overseeing mishap reporting regardless of mission needs to be built in to each district and at National. In my experience, there have been people who were leaders that were the source of the problem.
425.	My flotilla has almost no operations or in-person training. The online training, meetings, and occasional shoreside activities are very safe. If things improve in my AOR, the major safety concern will be the overall lack of experience and quality training.
426.	Flotilla Commander was being referenced on my lower score questions
427.	Most Safety Training is developed for the Response Directorate. Less is available for shoreside field and indoor activities.
428.	Safety is not yet a culture in the Auxiliary.
429.	In my role as Admin support, I couldn't answer some of the Leadership & Risk Management questions. With all my Auxiliary duties being computer-based, I can't answer about emergencies.
430.	The Auxiliary's culture of safety has failed to take hold as it was originally envisioned after a number of starts and stops from senior leadership. Titles were created and roles assigned at all levels of the organization, but there has been insufficient follow-through from the top and no accountability whatsoever.
431.	Our aviation unit is frequently grounded for purely administrative reasons (i.e., budget transitions at the start of a new fiscal year). To maintain currency and safety, aviation units need to fly consistently, without unnecessary long breaks. Auxiliary leadership in Hawaii is focused on surface. There is a serious lack of leadership interest and understanding of aviation.
432.	complacency is prevalent across the Auxiliary and this has a greater potential for increased risk

433.	In our area of operations we are very sensitive of the risks of our environment and communicate constantly with each other when things change.
434.	I had problems answering some of the leadership questions One is not born a leader, they are trained to be one. Leaders are also human. Not all leaders react the same under stress. The questions seem to say that all leaders come from the same cookie cutter. Not true.
435.	Auxiliary is a great place to volunteer, but need leaders that care about there members not just numbers.
436.	Nothing, at this time.
437.	For the most part the auxiliary does make sure we are safe and have the equipment to be safe
438.	I am ever impressed with the the UNIT REDACTED leadership. They are both calm and clear in the importance of safety.
439.	receive training from other organizations and disaster response team which are NOT part of Auxiliary
440.	While I believe safety and risk management are a focus of the Auxiliary, the application in practice is not as consistent. Areas of concern include: Long-standing members that are physically not able to fully perform, but do so anyway; Long-standing members who take a "know-it-all" attitude and don't listen to more junior members; despite the Auxiliary promoting a culture where anyone can stop an unsafe activity, in practice all members do not acknowledge this.
441.	I saw long term AUX members doing tasks I felt they no-longer can do safely and they were signed off on the task.
442.	I feel that National Leadership is too risk averse for the good of the Auxiliary Members who can make good decisions re: risk vs gain.
443.	n/a
444.	Overall I think safety is excellent and given proper consideration. I do think that a focus area should be how to respect privacy while also ensuring that member health issues, and potential effects of medications, can be incorporated into mission planning. I do not have concerns that unsafe situations have occurred, but rather that it may be area worth greater focus.
445.	I feel very safe in any Auxiliary activities I participate in.Safety is definitely a priority.
446.	I do not have any further comments on the Safety Climate Survey.
447.	I am not at all certain of the leaderships involvement in safety as the person responsible for PPE at the flotilla and Division levels is not a staff officer.
448.	I think senior leaders are being engaged with the idea of safety but we need an effective way to bring that to the deckplate. This isn't something that is top of mind for the average Auxiliarist. Perhaps adding a statement or some slides to the BQCII course would be useful for incoming members. Another idea could be an annual workshop on safety to keep all qualifications/ offices. Thanks for doing this survey!
449.	While this survey focused on safety climate and culture issues, I marked two questions regarding leadership's accountability as ones due to the lack of accountability our elected leadership generally does not have. There is still a "Yacht Club" elitism in the upper leadership that does not respond to the needs of the average member. COMOs and National Staff should empower and advocate for the deckplate, not take credit for their work, as well as hold the deckplate accountable to similar standards as our active duty and reserve shipmates. I joined the AUX to serve alongside them, not to be prevented in doing my job.
450.	It can be awkward to speak up if, for example, a Coxswain commits a minor safety issue while on patrol, especially in a small flotilla. If I report the incident to the FC, the FC is probably

	going to inform the Coxswain the source of the report and it is unknown if the Coxswain will hold a grudge.
451.	I need a little more training and involvement in USCG Auxiliary activities. I know safety is an important factor in the Auxiliary.
452.	Most Aux leaders do NOT have any idea what hazards and risks are involved in Marine Safety (MS) missions. Most of their focus is on boat/patrol ops and the RM/TCT training is all about boat ops. (why not do a scenario on PE, PA or MS?) This leads the members to think that the safety and RM is only about boat ops and not EVERYTHING we do. The members involved with MS missions have to scramble to assemble the PPE needed for these missions, purchase their own, or borrow from the Active Duty. The MS programs need their own PPE funding stream and lockers for those items in each Sector where these missions occur (helmets, safety gloves, coveralls, flotation devices, rain gear, high-vis safety vests, tools, etc.) Borrowing from the Active Duty is a problem as they sometimes they barely have enough to cover their own people, plus their items are marked with USCG not USGCAUX. The safety briefings done by the Active Duty are far better than what the AUX does. (This isn't just a problem in one Sector...it is the same in several I have talked to across the country.) Most Aux leaders don't consider Marine Safety as an operations program at all. To prove my point, this survey doesn't ask anything about or include Marine Safety as an operations program.
453.	I believe in mentoring ,a on hand approach with Program visits, Vessel Exams and training junior and senior members .In the following area in field training and on hands training with auxdata II. A personal approach to our fellowship so they don't feel lost in the process. This approach help my members of my flotilla and assist sister flotillas as well. We as a flotilla try promoting team work.
454.	Leaders know risks, know safety methods, but often don't apply to themselves or teach them to others.
455.	Could not change email even when it said change email
456.	I am an Instructor for the RM Refresher, and it continues to be frustrating that tenured members do not treat it seriously and are vocal about it taking too long to teach appropriately. This negatively effects new members who are attending for the first time. I also strongly disagree with the common practice of combining the RM Refresher and the OPS Workshop. I understand the convenience, but it reinforces that the RM Refresher is primarily for Operations when we are trying to emphasize risk management for all our missions. It also results in both the RM Refresher and OPS Workshop being rushed through,
457.	There are so many different manuals that it can be difficult for a person to become familiar with so that they can navigate effectively when searching for policy topics.
458.	My comments are predicated upon duties associated with on water operations. With respect to questions about my knowledge of where to report and the like, there should be follow up questions along the lines of if you have no current knowledge or recollection of reporting policies and/or procedures what is your level of confidence that you can find same with relative ease on the auxiliary website.
459.	Some PPE seems difficult to obtain, mainly due to availability. When SO-OP claims to lose requests for PPE, or spreadsheets , they should inform members to resubmit or explain why no issuance is granted. These items should be available from any unit's excess supply within the Divisions and Districts when required by individuals. Aren't we all ONE AUXILIARY?
460.	I am not involved in Operations anymore, so I am unaware of any new safety protocols there. I would be concerned of some members acting as "On scene command" in any situation they walk into, following all the Incident Command System and Risk Management training received. Risk Management regarding winter weather predictions that may affect course and meeting schedules can be questionable for safety concerns at times.

The current Auxiliary membership involved in operations activities is getting older and less physically mobile. I was relieved to see that additional physical and swimming requirements have been addressed but the only on-water experience is planned training that does not cover real world situations and decisions that can arise. We have been standing down, waiting for Sea Tow etc. to arrive, not having actual open-water experiences. For example, I seriously doubt that many of the qualified crews would be able to lift an unconscious 250-pound person up and over 3 feet of freeboard on their vessels, especially without a swim platform. Therefore, attracting younger members should be a priority for operational and safety concerns, but is very difficult without any real incentives to attract and hold on to active members. Maybe something like an income tax credit or reduction, no dues required for active members, or reduced cost for the high price of uniforms would INDIRECTLY have an effect on safety by attracting & retaining membership. 10% off at Home Depot doesn't offer much and isn't even from the Coast Guard or US government. Certificates, awards, stripes, ribbons, and metals don't entice generation X. More and more programs and training requirements, and less FELLOWSHIP time. The membership puts a great deal of personal time, energy, training, and money into this volunteer organization that just seems to increase over the years. Time to "toss a bone down" to the dedicated volunteers or risk that the organization becomes a nice thing from the past that used to promote SAFETY on the water; and sadly, watch the accident statistics increase.

461. Current leadership misunderstands the nature of operational risk to the point of increasing our real risks by limiting training and evolutions of a preventive nature. Furthermore the focus is so much on preventive as to miss the obvious need to teach to handle mishaps, which will occur no matter how much the leadership tries to prevent them. The point of diminishing returns has been reached in operational training a long time ago. Examples are night missions. They are made so difficult to hold as to limit their numbers which in turn increases the risks of mishaps.

462. N/A

463. Most of my reticence has to do with not feeling fully confident in myself that I would think clearly enough in an emergency situation. We practice those, but even then, without direct day to day events that require that I think through the various steps, how would I respond in an emergency situation? Not that sure.

464. GAR system seems to work pretty well, especially in surface operations. Other than that, not much said at all about safety.

465. I feel all AUX members are concerned about safety. Not sure if DHS has our backs?

466. I have no PPE assigned to me, because I am not on the boat crew.

467. During my coxswain 3 year evaluation I was forced to attempt a side by side docking maneuver that I considered a high risk:
 1 - an approaching storm meant we had to rush the maneuver of changing from long tow to side by side.
 2 - Although I expressed that my vessel was too small to dock a much larger and heavier vessel; I was told that if I did not complete safely and successfully the maneuver, I would be disqualified as a coxswain. Since I was not able to control the larger vessel to complete the maneuver, I was disqualified as a coxswain.

468. District REDACTED had a shortage of PLBs recently, which made patrol planning difficult and may have caused crew shortages on certain patrols. At times, safety briefings/discussions are rushed and shorter than I believe they should be in the interest of getting underway or back to base.

469. The Auxiliary is rife with members who focus "gotcha's" whenever and wherever possible. This leads to disfunctionality and loss of members. CGAux leadership at lower levels

	has to focus on rooting out and calling out that behavior or face continuing loss of members who actually get things done vs the "ramp vultures" who sit on the sidelines, pointing fingers.
470.	I still have a lot to learn but the teachers are excellent and I will learn more.
471.	Reported an on-water mishap (no damage nor injuries) and was soundly criticized citing my lack of navigational skills. Maybe next time a minor mishap will go unreported.
472.	No additional comments
473.	I have been in the Aux. for over 15 years and have enjoyed it "mostly"
474.	Training in my Flotilla is usually limited to those who are available during the day (hard to attend when working full time) OR during the monthly flotilla meeting which continues to be mostly virtual. I have been with the Auxiliary for over 20 years and miss the training that I received from the Gold side at the station.
475.	Risk management is essential
476.	There is a lot of talk the talk but less walk the walk.
477.	When a storm is coming I want to go out, but there is no one there to go because the Auxiliary creates more reasons to stay home than to go out on patrol.
478.	I couldnt get propper PPE to go out on patrol,,,hence became unqualified . Questions of survey were so BROAD to have little meaning, we spend tooo much time looking FOR failures rather than expounding on SUCCESSES. TCT format is poor and dosent lead to greater skill levels to prevent things. Current training seems to trend to finding reason NOT to do something rather than understanding that there will always be risks and unepcted events and teamwork is what gets a crew thru tougher missions. Failuer to install confidence in members. Spending too much time nitpicking things that generally are not repeatable.
479.	mostly shore-side. On-line and official training, rather than from leaders
480.	1) Nonchalance and hyper-confidence are palpably pervasive in the Auxiliary. 2) Some of the survey questions don't apply to the type of work I do for the Auxiliary, so I didn't answer them. 3) Thank you for this opportunity.
481.	I think the CG and Auxiliary can do a better job of investing in PPE for boat crew and aircrew alike. As a crewmember or aircrew member, I should be able to request and get initial and replacement PPE with minimal delays. If our budget for PPE is not the highest of funding priorities, we are making the wrong choices as leaders.
482.	The new annual boat crew/Cox currency maintenance requirements actually increase risk and deter participation into the future.
483.	I feel the Mustang "Float Coat" should continue to be part of our PPE. In the Northern climes it is an important item taken on patrols. As the sun sets, the air gets a lot colder than what we had in the first half of the patrol. Many times, I have donned the float coat to stay warm, as well as offer flotation protection. Please keep the float coat available to all Auxiliarists.
484.	AGREE
485.	Keep up the cross agency and branch trainings. And let's do more with national recruiting efforts.
486.	Na
487.	As a chaplain, I am ready to help any who suffer.
488.	I feel with extended periods of where missions are cut, skills become rusty, with rust, there is not enough practice / training to keep members of the aviation wing in full readiness. There is not enough exercises that involve surface or even active duty to keep skills honed.

489.	The Auxiliary needs to understand the limitations of an elderly workforce and mitigate any undue stresses that can add to fatigue, injury. We are not a young group of volunteers and some CG standards may not be easily accomplished by some members
490.	Many Elected Leaders on the Flotilla, Division, and some District Levels aren't as proactive as they need to be. This could be either for lack of information or lack of interest. (If it doesn't affect me then I can't be bothered with it attitude)
491.	I am newer to boating and have not yet completed my Boat Crew Quals or I would be even more confident in my ability to report and act on safety. As it is, I am pretty confident based on training and support.
492.	If you have the 'Political Pull', you can be a total screw up and it will be swept under the carpet.
493.	I recall no training addressing near misses or mishaps. I know of no "Auxiliary Safety Center" that would collect reports. My safety training and responses focus on Boat Crew risk assessment. There is no useful go-by on Heat Illness--as covered in Boat Crew manuals, that is nearly worthless (I am a retired Navy Physician who is well versed).
494.	PPE continues to be a concern as it is generally ordered once a year. New auxiliaries are being qualified on a monthly basis and not receiving PPE until many months (up to one year) later. We need quarterly PPE ordering through the coast guard in my opinion. Additionally, while safety is extremely important, I feel the Auxiliary is often limited in what we can do. I think the Auxiliary should be given more work even at an increased risk level.
495.	We need more Risk Management/Team Coordination Training (RM/TCT) training and trainers. We should coordinate and share member training through a National Training Calendar on the CGAux.Org website for trainers to post courses if offered on Zoom as a ONE-STOP-SHOP for necessary training and workshops.
496.	Training alone does not stop stupidity.
497.	The AUX Safety Program has a lot of information about safety. There is not a direct link to "the" Auxiliary Safety Policy that I have found. I may have overlooked it but a particular document by that name was not obvious to me.
498.	We do not have enough PLB's
499.	Need to balance safety with common sense. We do not need to cater to the lowest common denominator. Majority of us have the common sense to do the job. Need to balance "the abundance of safety" with what is practical and necessary.
500.	The undercurrent is that as Auxiliarists, the lack of funding is severely impacting readiness. We simply avoid doing certain activities because we do not have enough resources. Example is a flotilla with no facilities but have members who want to participate by being a part of Boat Crew. Inland flotillas (30 miles inland) are most impacted. this impacts readiness and a by product, a lack of safety awareness. Aux give quite a bit, and a nice thank you would be federal tax incentives, ability to participate in tri-care upon retirement, just something to say thank you for volunteering for our country.
501.	Hazards are identified and mitigated and risk/reward is considered in USCG Aux ops. We have canceled ops when conditions were considered unsafe. We have also halted ops and returned to port to drop off a sick crew member.
502.	Latest safety equipment needs to be better distributed and made available at all levels through the COLM. Latest safety hand-me-downs PPE from USCG, I feel are insufficient, and in several cases in my own experience woefully out of date in availability and quality to Auxiliary prior to assignment to Boat Crews, in particular.
503.	I would like to see Auxiliary Stan teams, not to criticize but help to improve procedures.
504.	None

505.	Most of my safety training has come from the MMC world. Some AUX activities / quals have higher level of RM, on the job experience, and training. Two comments: 1. the most dangerous person is the one who does not know what they do not know. 2. The biggest elephant in the discussion is AUX members being able to honestly self evaluate their ability and changing mental and physical capabilities as they get older.
506.	C2: Aside from reporting to FC/VFC, not sure where else to report to. C4: As far as comfortable: does that mean knowing how to report or does it mean confidence in reporting? C5: Completely unaware of how to report anonymously P1: Other than AUXMAN or relevant operations manual? WOW/National Site is a disaster to navigate. L1: Haven't experienced/witnessed any unexpected events yet. L3: When needed, which is rare for our Flotilla as we are rebuilding. R1: No idea if we have ANY equipment for members to use; and if we do, probably not in good condition. R2: Need more activities to be able to really say. We're working on being more active. R3: My rating here could be influenced by my previous outside training and experiences. FINAL THOUGHT: Can we please be treated like the part of the U.S. Coast Guard that we actually are?! These new uniforms are absolutely ridiculous. How can we claim to be "One Team" if we look nothing alike?! At least fix the new nametapes and shoulder patches to be decently similar.
507.	Some policies are overly conservative causing members to take unnecessary risk. For example, in Auxair a qualified and current instrument rated pilot may not fly in IMC with crew as a single pilot. Hence in order to avoid IMC they may risk flying at low altitudes to remain VFR.
508.	CoL/M for surface operations must insure a minimum of BCM qualification.
509.	I feel that there are auxiliary members who care and strive to be the best possible and then there are those who do the absolute min to get by. Their knowledge of boat safety and their own performances would not be allowed if the system had some back up. The good old boys club still is alive in some aeras. People can get away getting quals by shopping for a qe's and going around the system. We need to get rid of the word Minium and make it the standard period. We need to be able to perform the mission. This behavior will continue until someone really gets hurt. Heard about the safety climate once all last year from leadership in our aera.
510.	Most of my work is with AUXAIR. I have had a mishap and felt comfortable with who needed to be advised, the steps and felt supported throughout.
511.	My primary role does not have any formal safety procedures developed for it.
512.	As a new member, I have confusion on how to get available training, what roles require PPE, how to obtain PPE, what may be covered by the Auxilliary and what may be out of pocket. As I progress in my training, I'm sure that will be clarified, but as a new member, it's vague at best. I want to assist in things like IS, USCG administration assistance and USCG recruiting (not vessel exams, or vessel crew member, or watch stander - where the training is more clear) and still am unsure about what next steps to take for training, etc. Having a one page sheet for new member's first 6 months to a year, a one page sheet on each mission with the description of what a typical Aux does, required training, where to get the training, local flotilla and division contacts for more information, etc. would be extremely helpful.
513.	Cold weather gear is in very short supply ie exposure/ dry suit. Accidents don't just happen during warm weather patrols. But, unless we have proper PPE we can't get underway during the winter months or cold weather.
514.	I feel that being involved in RISK vrs GAIN, and annual RM/TCT makes us all better in accessing any task we are involved in our daily lives.

515.	My opinion: More emphasis is placed on proper uniform appearance instead of safety procedures.
516.	Safety is important and should be included at any event not just operations.
517.	<p>cheap out on giving crew Mustangs and other gear. spend so much time on risk assessment and additional trainings its nearly impossible to complete singoffs and get underway to keep up all of the qualifications and remain a full and active participant while being a working aged adult/ parent.</p> <p>hard to be an effective trainer/ COX also with having to helm-sit the entire time. COX cant participate in other activities to allow crew to function the way they preffer and feel safe since tied down at/ near helm.</p>
518.	None
519.	<p>Regarding PPE gear the removal of inflatable PFDs from service is a major mistake especially in hot weather areas. The mandate of using full type III will subject the wearer to heat related issues and impact force readiness and potentially dangerous dehydration.</p> <p>Regarding readiness to in case of an emergency all is dependent upon the type of emergency and if the probability of such type of event to occur and trying for such an emergency.</p> <p>Generally, it is felt the survey is too general and broad to attempting to glean the results desired. Some will read too much into the questions others will not thusly, skewing the data.</p>
520.	Have not had the opportunity to get on the water in the four years with the auxiliary no facility in our flotilla. Participation has dropped to 20 percent of capability.
521.	The training, ICS is the way you handle incidents.
522.	<p>Anonymous mishap reporting? I have MULTIPLE OPS qualifications (COX/TCO), and I have NEVER heard of such a thing! Not that it matters... since I have no idea how to report a mishap other than sending it up the routine COLM (where there are a million opportunities for the report to get accidentally lost or intentionally buried).</p> <p>In my area, there is this terribly toxic attitude about asking the active duty for guidance. There is terrible hesitance to ask for the documents that we need. EXAMPLES: We are supposed to follow the Sector AUX Navigation Standards. I have never seen them, and when I ask the COLM for them... their response is that they don't want to embarass the Active Duty by asking for something they may not have. Actually, I think the real reason that these requests get killed by the COLM is that my leaders realize that they should have asked for these documents LONG ago.... and it is embarrassing to ask for them now. Why are these not readily available in the online AUX "Member Zone"?</p> <p>I suspect that my sector will be completely shocked at how dysfunctional their response will be to the first time one of our inland units activates a PLB in a genuine Mayday situation. We usually have a local radio watch... yet sector has no interest in knowing how to contact that radio watch. SO, if the sector command center gets notified of an inland AUX PLB with a "local radio watch".... they have no ability to contact that radio watch for the most current info about the patrol.</p> <p>I am amazed that there is no effort to ensure that the units using "local radio watch" have a suitable "lost communications" procedure. Why is there no enforcement of a standard for what the time thresholds are for action in a "lost comms" situation? One could easily write a standard for what a local policy needs to address and allow the local unit to customize their policy to meet their specific situation. Potential elements in that standard are: How long without communication is tolerated before local radio watch alerts others? What is the sequence of entities to be contacted and their contact numbers. (BTW... while the active duty may think that the first call</p>

	should be to the command center... I think that there is a strong argument that 911 is the first call for inland units with a "local radio watch". What does calling the command center provide in terms of actions that actually help our shipmates in trouble?.... NOTHING. Letting the command center know soon, but not first, makes good sense. If we call the command center, we are likely going to be delayed a LONG time before calling 911.)
523.	Boat crews are small. It would be difficult to remain anonymous.
524.	Some time it appears that Safety in the Auxiliary is lib service
525.	The yearly risk management training is useful and well presented. On patrol some members do not understand that every persons voice should be heard.
526.	Lack of PLB's creates problems with training & patrols
527.	We need more shipmates to step up to qualify as QEs, TCT, and Operations Workshop Instructors. Current instructors need to step up to mentor members through qualifications.
528.	Upper leadership strongly rejects and any negative feedback, and has created a culture of retribution, secrets, favoritism, dissembling and cronyism.
529.	Very pleased proud to be part of the Coast Guard Auxiliary
530.	TELEPHONE NUMBER REDACTED
531.	More emphasis should be put on boating and public ed on boating affairs instead of non related items, such as diversity, civil rights, etc. items that have no place in our marine and safety curriculum / military / service to mariners and marine coastal protection which are the objectives of the USCG/USC-Aux.
532.	Thank you for let me Knowles where I am, and WhatsApp áreas I need to improve. Th
533.	Safety and risk management are primary concerns in our division. Due to the nature of our missions we could not perform without the concern for safety and being aware of the situations surrounding us.
534.	Rushing through a GAR assessment with some crew not present or not paying attention is an issue. 'Kick the tire & light the fire' rush to get underway on a MOM patrol without a thorough pre-flight/pre-underway inspection of a facility remains an issue. Improper wearing of PPE/SAR gear -is an issue, wearing survival knife upside down on top of PFD like Rambo is unsafe yet observed more than a few times. Lack of AOR familiarity, lack of USCG Station or Sector phone numbers or emergency contact/Comm procedures if "suddenly in command" is an issue with crews. Speaking up with 'constructive criticism' to mitigate or address safety issues is not always welcome & results in not getting asked back to crew again -not conducive to CG-1132 Safety Assurance & Risk Reduction culture.
535.	NAME REDACTED
536.	To receive a higher score, from me, safety references should be readily accessible.
537.	I personally feel that there is an over abundance of redundancy in the training. I think this is driving Auxiliarists to leave.
538.	I would love to participate on the safety board.
539.	TCT training and other guidance and practices are deployed and support visibly.
540.	Near misses are treated as major events. Reporting them in my local culture creates problems that aren't worth the effort.
541.	I no longer do boat crew
542.	While I generally feel safe in my Auxiliary activities, I don't remember ever "reporting" near misses. We might talk about them later (hey, you wouldn't believe what happened, etc.) in a group bull session. I am unaware of an official process for reporting a near miss.

543.	Can't know everything that will happen and didn't want to appear cocky so answered at 4 instead of 5.
544.	Upper section leaders of Auxiliary is not qualified in this subject matter. The lower level auxiliary just wants to make it thur the year with no issues.
545.	R3 - There are always situations that could arise in areas where a person does not have any knowledge or experience. Making a good decision might not necessarily be the right decision.
546.	workshops need to be more frequent concerning difficult situations in order to help expedite competent decisions
547.	NA
548.	N/A
549.	N/A
550.	Every meeting should start with a safety message. This will help build a safety culture.
551.	our direct leaders are well prepared and promote safety. national leadership imho spends way to much time on political correctness, unnecessary formality that we are not trained for and what feels like busy work instead of helping with the need for training, experience and participation
552.	Leadership has a tendency to overreact to mishaps by attempting to mitigate all risk by prohibiting members from engaging in risky situations or requiring redundant safety training that has little effect on improving the culture of safety which comes across as a box being checked.
553.	Individual and group safety is taken seriously.
554.	Safety briefings are a benefit to auxiliarists
555.	Safety is top priority
556.	Distribution of PPE was limited concerning PEPiRBS in 2022. The expired batteries were not being replaced and there was a severe lack of communication about the procedure to attain batteries and/or refurbished PEPiRBS. There was an understanding that UNIT REDACTED did not have any to distribute. Flotillas were sharing among crew, without a good understanding of the tracking of to which crew member they belonged. Due to expense, not all were refurbished, which caused a shortfall of PEPiRBS even to share. How can this be avoided in the future?
557.	We know what to do but do not always have leadership agreement and support
558.	Our PPE hasn't been inspected years beyond the recommended inspection dates on the equipment or in the regs.
559.	I need more training in safety
560.	We work in Alaska's cold waters, where safety is of paramount importance due largely to the enhanced risk of hypothermia. AUX coxswains and crew receive not just task but survival training on a regular basis.
561.	All answers depend on who the leadership person is and what the particular task is being performed and if the task is being performed with the Gold Side or just the Auxiliarists.
562.	I feel very confident the leaders of our training are very safety conscious and promote an atmosphere where reporting safety concerns and voicing safety concerns is expected.
563.	Most of the time I answered in the middle of the road because I have found that depending on the flotilla and or the work, the leadership varies greatly. As far as the group I do Helo ops and boat crew with- they are VERY safety conscious and encourage everyone to speak up with safety concerns.

	<p>At other areas such as Aux CA, not so much. When I tried to get the people making salad to wear gloves, I was ignored.</p> <p>Overall there is no consistency with the rules and regulations concerning safety in my mind. Your questions are too vague when it comes to safety. What are you asking? Boat crew, Helo-ops, Aux CA or other activities. You need to ask more specific questions.</p>
564.	All issues covered appropriately
565.	I have not been trained ENOUGH on how to react to different mishaps.
566.	In my experience, the AUX maintains safety in step with USCG, ant falter will stop the mission.
567.	Something really needs tobe done about safety.
568.	I feel that in the surface boat operations and aux air missions, safety and brief/de-briefs are practiced and encouraged. It is the other areas that require a focus. There is an imbalance from boat and air Ops as compared to the other mission areas, station watchstanding, program visitor, vessel exams, etc. We need to take from these two areas and broadcast it to a wider audience.
569.	This comment is being used to communicate up the ladder about sexual discrimination. I am a White women 76 years old with boating experience my whole life. It's disgusting to receive the comment "How come a girl like you knows so much about boats?". If I were a Black man would you say "How come a boy like you knows so much about boats?" Hardly, you wouldn't dare. Sexist comments are never from my flotilla members, just from the division, district and national. Another situation is being called "My dear", again always from elderly men, who belittle women by addressing them this way. In the USCG Aux women and men should be treated as members of a boating safety organization, not with endearing terms like "My dear". Sickening - - -
570.	A material issue regarding safety (with a Boat Crew lens) is that a number of coxswains are getting "past their prime" physically (eyesight, hearing issues) to really operate safely but, at the same time, are 1/gatekeepers for crew to be able to get underway and 2/see themselves as "knowing better". This creates a situation where there is no real incentive nor ability to truly manage and report risks underway.
571.	Our flotilla has many long time members (decades of membership) that have lost interest, desire and ambition to support the flotilla, including attending meetings. This leaves a huge gap in the intellectual capital that these important resources possess and the lack of interest in passing this information along to newer members. Even those who espouse to be mentors to new members during training fade into the background until prompted to surface and help. The mentorship that is provided leaves an impression that it's more of a bother than a pleasure to help new members assimilate into their roles. This climate is directly linked to this survey as risk avoidance takes a bit of a back seat. Our more senior members have made great contributions in their time as Auxiliary members and succession planning is non existent. Some feel they want to hold onto their position as FSO-xx and appear to feel threatened that newer members may override them. Technology changes quickly and what was once the way to do things, becomes updated to the way we can now do things better and more efficiently. As time ages us, more members are disengaging due to their declining health issues. This exacerbates the problem of succession planning and results in a few filling the positions of many. Doing so increases risk across the board.
572.	Safety permeates Air Opps
573.	In March 2020, I was able to serve on a mission with District REDACTED in the American Virgin Islands. Covid broke out at the same time and when the Division UNIT REDACTED Commander and District UNIT REDACTED Captain East heard of my participation in District UNIT REDACTED, they immediately began a punitive inquiry, requesting mission orders, etc. Saying they were concerned about my safe return during Covid, they worked hard to find a violation in auxiliary protocol. Their investigation was quickly shut down by the District

	UNIT REDACTED Ops Officer and when they found out my orders came from the gold side. There was no reprimand or consequence for either of those UNIT REDACTED officers. Can operational auxiliarists have faith and trust in leadership like that?
574.	In my experience as part of an air crew or taking the Station watch, I feel that there are reliable, experience colleagues available whenever I have questions or concerns. One area where I am inexperienced myself is how and where to report an incident or mishap. This may be because I have yet to have to need to do this, or because the OOD or PIC is present and I immediately report, consult with them while on duty.
575.	Safety and cpr training important
576.	On surface operations, a MOB drill (or actual) requires the CXN to turn the stern quickly away from the side of the event. I understand how this is important on a CG Cutter but on an Auxiliary surface vessel traveling at 15 to 20 kts during a normal patrol creates an unintended safety hazard. The feet per second traveled is a number larger than most Aux facilities length. MOB's happen suddenly, the quick turn manuver can catch the crew unprepared for the sudden change in direction possibly causing loss of balance, a fall or another MOB. I'd recommend modifying this training procedure to take into account the vessel speed and the reality that a MOB is already astern when the call-out is made.
577.	The vessel is poorly maintained, always has some functional disorders and checklists are pencil whipped to get on with the missions. The leadership expects perfect adherence to some regulations but will give a pass on safety equipment and gear in order to preserve a mission. Leadership by some is 'do as I say, not as I do'. Coxswains who have no personal boating experience should be apprenticed for a year before being given the responsibility for a boat and crew. The students will only learn from the examples of the leaders, not from the reg manual.
578.	I am an AUX SCOUT (AS) with limited boating experience. I am well versed in the SCOUT safety requirements and spent 10 days at the National Scout Jamboree but that was on land.
579.	The active - "Gold Side" needs to be more inclusive. I think we are respected as a bunch of old guys but we don't see a lot of mixing with the active personnel. I suppose their missions preclude them from having us observe or participate. I'm new enough to suggest impossible questions but taking one or two Auxiliarists on a local response would be well received.
580.	Leadership knows the risks in the environment where they spend time, but they have no idea what it is like on the waterfront in a rural environment. We are very much respected by the boating public. No one wears polo shirts where I live. We are safe and secure because the public knows us, respects us, and appreciates us. If, God forbid, some crazy person tries to act out against us because they think we are active duty coast guard, then at least that person, and the world, will know what side we are on. Respect our contributions, do not be condescending to us. Thank you.
581.	The "Protocol" for reporting while on a patrol is a bit unclear. That may simply be due to my lack of training. When on a patrol and things go wrong it's not 100% clear on EXACTLY how best to handle, execute, and report. Add to that the urgency of doing what's right and the stress level... well, nobody's perfect but it doesn't hurt to try.
582.	Risk management and Risk assessment are strongly emphasized in my AOR.
583.	Risk Management (TCT) should be mandatory for all members.
584.	i have had training for mishap and what to do in emergencies as a leadership
585.	Specific situations can change the level of scoring
586.	The Auxiliary seems to attract people who want to help out, but also people who enjoy the trappings of uniform and what looks like rank. The advice of taking one's duties seriously but

	not taking oneself seriously comes to mind. Luckily there are a few notable exceptions to this trend.
587.	Great job!
588.	I do not see any feedback/lessons learned from the mishap system. This system is simply oriented to provide reports on how we are doing. I have been developing case study presentations on marine incidents - collisions, allisions, injuries with the NTSB as a major source. They would be much more effective using information from Coast Guard forces. Requests for this information have been ignored.
589.	The most difficult thing to do in the Auxiliary is to find out where information is. District websites are full of information, but figuring out WHERE it is is frustrating and time consuming. An example are the materials needed for boat crew training. While the Boat Crew Qualification Handbook lists reading assignments, they are in a variety of places, and locating them is difficult.
590.	I think procedure policy for enabling a coxswain to be able to fill in as crew even if there coxswain quals are in Reyers pertaining to not having nav rules up to date especially in divisions where there is a shortage of crew, I think this does not utilize our personnel properly.
591.	Understood...
592.	Enjoy being a part of the CGAuxiliary & Flotilla UNIT REDACTED
593.	Safety is emphasized at every flotilla meeting
594.	Personal Wellness is an important safety consideration as part of personal risk management assessment.
595.	The first year as an Auxiliarist with the US Coast Guards was amazing! I am looking forward to more great opportunities to serve as I learn.
596.	THANKS FOR CHECKING UP BUT OUR FLOTILLA VERY INTENT ON SAFETY
597.	National Leadership knows what to do in an emergency or mishap situation, however that does not translate to leadership as it comes down the chain becomes less and less aware. This is compounded by leaders who are voluntold to take leadership positions with little to no training in mishaps, mishap reporting, or risk management (outside the required training everyone takes).
598.	I am coming up on 24 years as a member of USCGAUX. I'll just say, "not as safety conscious as they used to be". Too much personal exposure and USCGAUX leaders are just to "woke" to be safe!
599.	None
600.	I do not feel that upper leadership listens to concerns nor follows up to effect change.
601.	We can always learn more or refresh
602.	I personally believe we have too many administrative and training requirements imposed on Auxiliarists which are not related to safety which are overly burdensome and act as a barrier to entry and retention. Safety policies have become more constrictive without apparent intended effect - for example, one can no longer become Aux Air Observer qualified without having attended Aux 17 first. Yet there are only a few Aux 17 classes each year with a long gap between August and the new year due to funding. This results in auxiliarists becoming discouraged. It appears that many of the active duty-like requirements are imposed on Auxiliarists who do not have the time due to their real jobs, etc. I believe these administrative and training requirements have contributed greatly to the attrition in the Auxiliary and in Aux Air.
603.	None

604.	I am still in my first year as an Auxiliary member and have had little exposure to operations so far and my answers reflect that lack of direct Auxiliary experience. I hold a quality management Masters degree and a certificate in Change Management and I have experience in both areas and in Enterprise Risk Management.
605.	I enjoy my duties and appreciate the level of risk management my flotilla leadership practices.
606.	for answers with a 3, i have no idea if leadership has risk management tng. have never "worked" a job where ppe was needed/issued.
607.	Due to the vast backgrounds and experiences of the membership, I believe that there should be more safety training for activities that we don't perform everyday. some of those may be traveling to an event. Weather conditions at the events as well as working with the public in large numbers such as Grand Haven CG Festival.
608.	I have noted that there has been a severe lack of "Gold Shield" involvement in the Auxiliary operations and functions at the unit level. The excuses range from Covid-19 to lack of personnel and I am sure that this does have a major affect on personnel working with the Auxiliary. That being said, if you want to have an organization that follows the standards you need to be involved and "Leading" not just sending memos to enforce edicts. I see that when the Active personnel work with and involve themselves with the Auxiliary a mutual culture of respect and sharing of standards are the result. Bottom line: If you want a safety culture that is reflective of the Active Duty Coast Guard then make it a 'one team, one fight' philosophy and you will get it.
609.	In my direct experience, some auxiliary leaders tend to blur the line between auxiliary and active duty response levels. While safety may be stressed during a pre mission or pre activity briefing actions during the mission/activity may be approached as the old "you have to go out, you don't have to come back" attitude. While I generally feel empowered to cancel an activity or mission, often I can't because the coxswain or leader will not relinquish any control. The overall RM training is a good program but requiring the entire class each year seems to turn people off. When I use a newer scenario, I get more involvement and discussion. In the old program, we had a new update each year that kept everyone involved and interested. Repeating the same material has not prompted any newer discussions and I think has reduced the comprehension level of the participants.
610.	I'm a treasurer and I don't go to any activities that are at risk or dangerous. Most all the other members are pilots and keep up on their training.
611.	Let's work to get everyone opportunitys
612.	Unclear
613.	The Coast Guard needs to do a better job of providing the appropriate PPEs, namely Dry Suits where needed.
614.	The auxiliary has an abundant assortment of classes pertaining to safety and risk management. Is leaderships responsibility to assure that membership is aware of these classes in that membership takes classes to assist them in their auxiliary duties.
615.	We don't practice the change in our RM assessment during active patrols. To know how and when to re-evaluate your GAR during a patrol when weather or fatigue sets in. Especially during a SAR event.
616.	n/a
617.	Our unit has regular instruction on safety issues, but we have not had many opportunities to practice them in real life in the recent past. With the passing of Covid restrictions I assume that should change. Safety is a priority.
618.	n/a
619.	We need more mandatory training

620.	Sometimes I feel Auxiliary leadership is more interested in creating an environment of risk avoidance as opposed to mitigation. One off mishaps or occurrence do not need to necessarily have to impact ALL Auxiliarists.
621.	On 10/23/2017 I had a recordable accident...it went up the chain of command and then was forward to a state agency with no resolution...out of pocket expenses were in excess of \$650.00 after my insurance. I still believe it wasn't handled properly...
622.	Our flotilla has been without PLB's for five months due to expiration. Division has known about this issue for seven months.
623.	Minor mishaps tend to be treated excessively
624.	The CGAUX is very good at mitigating risks by both action and doctrine.
625.	I love the USG Aux and I think we do a terrific job of training and saving lives in our AOR
626.	Being a leader I understand how safety affects the membership.
627.	Training is the key. And making sure maintenance is done correctly.
628.	I work primarily in radio communications. The Auxiliary is deficient in truly understanding what comms are about and what types of safety training apply. The Auxiliary has antiquated ideas about radio use, mechanical hazards and electrical hazards as well as lacking appropriate training. Yet, leadership is always ready to deny permission for tower climbing even if the Auxiliarist is OSHA certified. Please fix this. After fighting the system for 16 years I am ready to leave the Auxiliary.
629.	I am unclear how this pertains to my duties.
630.	Generally, I think safety gets over emphasized in theory and overlooked in practice.
631.	The only '4' I noted is because I have not heard from Division leadership in a year. The DCAP is currently providing oversight.
632.	These days to be blacklisted is to call out a safety concern. 1st time might be forgiven, if it happens again you can be certain you will not be added to crew again.
633.	As an ACS Chaplain, I often work closely with the Active Duty side, and follow their safety protocols.
634.	NEVER COMPROMISE SAFETY!
635.	I think better training leadership will help. I think leadership needs to remember we all are volunteers and to treat all the same
636.	Nothing to add
637.	our flotilla and division missions are conducted safely and briefings are conducted prior to each mission. I feel comfortable during operations as an auxiliarist.
638.	It could be better if we get training with CG.
639.	Refresh and review training and safety before each season is important
640.	Safety for admin work is not a topic addressed often (nor required), other than emergency egress.
641.	Politics are HUGE and if you are not in line, you are unwelcome. As a vet, I am very unwelcome
642.	Training is not regular enough nor does it often reach those that need it. without a regular safety issues training members can become lazy.
643.	I feel very good about our focus on safety

644.	Very Impressed about each question, risk management is very important having the safety resources available to Auxiliary members on each hazard prevention category, and emphasizing the preclusion on avoiding scenarios will make us a better leader.
645.	Our training is very clear on risk management
646.	I answered according to operating on my regular facility, not others.
647.	I answered 3 on several questions that seemed to not apply to my situation. I currently have no duties with the Auxillary and I cannot seem to find a path, through my Flotilla to actively volunteer for the USCG - I am able, willing and ready, but cannot seem to get assignmnets yet.
648.	I feel that our auxiliary leadership is concerned and focused on member safety and definitely encourage commemts, input and incident reports.
649.	X
650.	Finding safety equipment information for OPFACS & operations has become increasingly difficult since many changes in PPE are occurring regularly.
651.	I am retired Navy (23 yrs) as well as an aviator and boat crew trained. I feel well equiped for my duties and am likely not the 'average' member. That being said, I am anticipating a significant change to the boat environment that will be a negative towards general safety on the boat due to the change from the use of current inflatable PFD to a Type III which will create an environment limiting movement and speed of movement on board as well as subjecting crew to an elevated risk in hot weather environments. This does not seem to be taken into account by senior leadership.
652.	Workflow process is pretty good, need to be Web base to be able to see on going importants.
653.	There needs to be more training for the office positions held by Auxiliarists. Especially new members need more mentoring to guide them to understand what some office positions are and what is expected of them if they decide to take the position. I think there is excellent training for boat crews and vessel examiners and all such types of jobs, however, there is a lack in training for the FSOs and SOs office positions.
654.	More refinedm of coues
655.	Hands on training is crucial to success and team building. My experience has been self lead web based training. The experience is alienating and leaves serious doubt to the level of commitment the Auxiliary or USCG has in personnel. Vast improvement is needed in all training areas.
656.	More members in communications and operations need to learn how to effectively use Digital Selective Calling (DSC). It could be the difference between life and death on day.
657.	As a materials officer, I find it difficult sometimes getting the proper PPE for our members such as cold weather gear, life jackets, etc.
658.	I would like to see a practice that requires, whenever possible, a person to assist with operations when backing. (A trailer in particular.)
659.	Aux coxswains are allowed to drink alcohol on board a facility
660.	I feel well educated with regards to safety. Through the Auxilliary I've taken CPR, and annual risk management courses, even blood borne disease training.
661.	"Confidence to handle emergencies" --heck no, I'm always afraid that, despite training and equipment, I'll come up short. 2) A team can be trained for every foreseeable emergency -- it will be the unexpected that sneaks up and gets them.
662.	My Aux assignments typically do not involve risk unless you consider driving miles to and from my duty assignments. As such, I found it difficult to provide adequate answers to this survey. I do however work with Gold Side personnel involved with high risk assignments so I am

	very familiar with the PEACE model and GAR assessments as they are used frequently whenever personnel get underway from the boat station. I attend the annual TCT training refresher to remain qualified. I am a comms watchstander at small boat station and work closely with crews undertaking underway operations.
663.	Safety is always a must
664.	I wonder weather meetings after dark constitute a risk (driving accident risk due to night vision issues) that members are taking into account by not attending those meetings and how we might mitigate that issue.
665.	We could do better with safety training with more training on what to do, constant review of hazards, reporting, and more conversations on board.
666.	In general, I have found working with the auxiliary safe and rewarding. There could be some improvements, in training, when a person assumes certain duties, and if I feel it is currently inadequate, I can take it upon myself to ensure the next person to assume a certain duty position, is better trained in that position.
667.	Leadership is TOO focused on safety.
668.	Regarding PPE: Our OTO has told us to destroy PPE over 8 years old, even though it may pass MPC Card inspection and float tests where applicable. Then this PPE is not replaced basically shutting us down from operations in winter months and severely limiting the ability's of our flotillas to support Station SARs and other operations.
669.	A few months ago, I encountered an Auxiliarist who got off the issue at hand and expounded in a relatively lengthy way about his displeasures with the Covid restrictions/vaccinations applied to the Auxiliary back during Covid and subsequent roll-outs, interfering with his freedoms, etc. To me, this attitude is unacceptable. It's basic Risk Management. We're supposed to be a team and looking out for each other. I also know that attitudes like this during and after Covid affected other Auxiliarist's freedoms, including the ability to get hours and making it harder to stay current with quals because their shipmates flaunted the Covid rules for activities that were allowed, making us feel unsafe to engage in those activities. Some of the flaunting people were in leadership roles at that time. Just because the forms for activities/events were filled out correctly didn't mean that's actually what happened. Very disappointed in my shipmates then, and to hear from a disgruntled Aux years later is also disappointing. His attitude is likely affecting how he operates in the Aux now which, in turn, affects others. (These issues happened in two Districts that I know of first-hand.)
670.	Liability seems to be the primary concern and makes any action taken unwanted
671.	I think that most of these questions do not apply to position that I know hold in the USCAUX. I started out as a crew trainee but not longer perform those duties.
672.	I would like to train with regular Coast Guard crews and have it included in my record.
673.	RMTCT is the most likely place members will receive safety training.
674.	Please consider that my answers are from a new member with minimal experience.
675.	r
676.	Work with both Active and Auxiliary. Active take safety much more seriously. Not sure Aux Leadership is aware of what members do or hazards they face.
677.	The lower the chain of command, the higher the conceived concern for our safety on a mission.
678.	I have very qualified leadership
679.	Any USCGA activity I've been involved in has covered safety in detail and I feel it's an integral part of my flotilla's operational mindset.

680.	AUX Leaders are NOT aware of the hazards faced by members participating in Marine Safety missions. We are not funded for PPE for these missions and have to scrounge or purchase our own PPE. Most of the items needed are not found in the The safety briefings and operational plans done on the Gold-side are much better than what is done by the Silver-side. All the focus by AUX Leaders is on Boat Ops and other RBS missions. Rarely is Marine Safety missions recognized as OPERATIONAL or even mentioned anywhere, even though we are working side by side with the AD and Reserves of the Coast Guard on these missions. This survey does not even list MS as a mission type or a choice in the activities for which we can acknowledge participation.
681.	Very informative information on the Coastguard mission in prevention of unwarranted disasters and unsafe unexpected hazards.
682.	So far safety training and information is very helpful and reliable.
683.	I feel and believe Safety is a top priority. It is not been drummed into my head on how to report anonymously but I believe I could find it if I had too.
684.	None
685.	Worthy work sheet
686.	understand the need for proper safety and risk management evaluation and response in all phases of Auxiliary operation in all mission environments and across all communities within the organization, and how " normalcy bias" may/can safety and risk management; from Observations and conversations with all levels of leadership and members as a Coast Guard/Auxiliary TCT/Risk Management Facilitator for over 23 consecutive years.
687.	.
688.	Appreciate that you saw my input
689.	Set up first aid and cpr classes with the coast guard, fire depts. or hospitals.
690.	Good survy
691.	I believe Aux leadership is well versed in policy and procedures and appreciate the consistancy in the delivery of this information. My only hesitation is in our ability to respond to unexpected challenges that aren't clearly defined or explained in policy. I would like to see more confidence in problem solving versus rote memory.
692.	Mentoring could be better. Oftentimes I am on my own as far as training goes.
693.	NEVER enough Safety Training
694.	As a AUX , I have not been able to attend due to work schedules and when I try to reach out on my off days, nobody has responded to my communication. I am looking for a another unit where I can contribute and become a active member and learn and grow and be a active member.
695.	N/A
696.	Overall, my experience involving the culture of safety has been fully beneficial.
697.	I feel in certain areas there needs to be a significant increase of collaborative training with the Active-Duty side specifically in Operations roles. Also, there is an aging cohort of QEs in Operations in UNIT REDACTED and there should be an investment in training those that are better suited for the environment (surface facilities) to keep the Gains high and Risks low for activities such as QE Check rides and training missions. I have concerns when there is a risk that the QEs may be a liability of being a SAR or a "Mishap" waiting to happen.
698.	On Some Of The Questions On Page #6, I Couldn't Explain The Question So I Put The Number I Figured Was The Appropriate One.

699.	UNIT REDACTED has lost some active duty personnel due to mishaps. We Auxiliarist continue striving toward total risk awareness. We here. need to further teach how to mitigate and recognize potential "everyday" risk.
700.	I am not sure what PPE equipment is required - nor do I have access to in-person training. The training also does not allow to access the training or provide me credit when I believe that I have completed the training course. I have two classes that I did not get credit for and I cannot find out the reason.
701.	Leaders know the process and under most circumstances relay them in a sound manner.
702.	Computer simulation is now considered a vital part of the aviation industry Crisis Resource Management (CRM) culture to train flight crews in aviation safety. This type of high fidelity computer simulation safety training should similarly be developed and used in the Auxiliary as a corollary to the traditional TCT/RM safety training curriculum. Simulation accelerates skill acquisition, improves skill retention, and reduces the extinction of skills. In addition to helping with critical decision making, it can help in reinforcing nontechnical skills such as task management, leadership, team coordination, and situational awareness. High fidelity computer simulation safety training (CRM) should be high on the list for future training in the auxiliary as it can be used to experience real-time simulated scenarios that are infrequent in daily occurrence but can occur in real time.
703.	The biggest problem I've had, in both Auxiliary activities and work, is "Leadership" by "Desk Jockey" type "Leaders" who've taken all the right prerequisites, and apparently done well, but have very little actual experience in dealing with rough events. I've been a Coxswain, Copilot, and many Flotilla Officer positions and had experiences supporting this position in almost all of them.
704.	Practice at least once a year in what to do in an unsafe situation ie fire drill would be very beneficial.
705.	I've been very happy at the training opportunities. I feel well trained and informed and am thankful to learning from experienced members of the USCG Auxiliary
706.	The Required Risk Management training makes certain that a safety culture is ingrained in the Auxiliary volunteer workforce! As a member (and when serving as a leader), I know that safety is a primary concern of the Auxiliary and of the USCG overall and everyone can report safety issues and look out for potential hazards.
707.	Regarding our 25 ft patrol boat for the Auxiliary use, 2 years ago the boat was not properly maintained so during a rainstorm the boat took on rain water and listed 45 degrees at the dock as the bilge pumps failed due to the batteries drained. As an experienced boater I stepped in to correct these problems and do important maintenance. However last fall the leadership again assigned the maintenance duties to another organization, the local fire department. The fire department did not do fall motor maintenance or even open the drain plugs which the boat sat in cold Illinois winter outside uncovered. The boat took on water while on the trailer. Again I had to step in and drain the boat and orchestrate the important boat and motor maintenance which division leadership looked the other way. I and other members conclude the leadership does not want a patrol vessel to be operational for our auxiliary use. The more I encounter this leadership control the more I witness favoritism, punishment for questions, ego, and a culture of retribution which many members shudder in fear. I have also learned the division leadership in their flotilla have had a feud with our flotilla over the past 5+ years, Similar to the Hatfields vs McCoys accusing each other of misdeeds. When I witnessed loyal 20 year Aux members being kicked out on trumped up charges I feel something needs to change. An investigation is warranted here as the ego of this leader is way beyond what any organization especially the Auxiliary, who ranks Safety as the number 1 goal, would deem out of acceptable range. Here is another question, in what organization would allow a person to continue to hold a position of DSO-OP and that officer never steps on to a boat all summer and never even views the boat in person all year? It would be my expectation the every Flotilla elected officer in a Division, unless somehow

	<p>physically un-able, would step on the Division patrol boat once a season. That rarely happens here in this Division. They are not Boat Crew qualified and do not even attend Boat Crew training when offered over 3 years! . How can Auxiliary leadership relate to Safety Issues when they only look at our patrol boat via photographs?</p> <p>In summary, National Leadership needs to have a open door and a anonymous 800 issue and complaint line where serious problems are reviewed and corrected. Thank you for this opportunity.</p>
708.	Leadership protects leadership, not regular members
709.	n/a
710.	We conduct safety briefings before departing on a Boat Crew mission. The emphasis is placed on if you see something, say something, as training videos have conveyed. We respect all in out from participants in filling out our Risak Assessment (GAR) before the mission. We will not go out if conditions are not safe.
711.	I have never in my 25 years seen in my view competent leadership above the Division level. All I have seen is 2bit politivians. The District Leadership is more involved in self glory which is tragic. i have seen especially good leaders be pushed aside for "friends" who will not "Rock the Boat"
712.	I feel very safe conducting my duties. I am well trained to respond safely to emergencies.
713.	The only improvement that I see a need for is more Gold to Silver side cooperative training on safety. Seems like safety takes a back seat to funding issues also.
714.	While I have a dry suit, not all of our boat crew members have access to a working dry suit even though they were requested months ago. This limits their ability to train and participate.
715.	No comments.
716.	Always have room to improve
717.	You can always improve
718.	Know your limits,boat and crew
719.	I thought I had just pulled a muscle but 4 months later it still hurts.
720.	I feel confident in reporting near-miss and mishaps through my chain of command and equally feel confident to voice a concern of a potential risk that may result in a near-miss or mishap. I am still new to the Auxiliary however I have received good training and am learning more so that I will be well qualified to halt activities if a real threat to life or property exists.
721.	Auxiliary members ability to carry firearms needs to be revisited. It is unsafe to not have firearms for appropriately trained/licensed Auxiliarists under certain circumstances.
722.	In my experience, reporting safety incidents results in immediate and overwhelming retaliation and the problem isn't addressed. This is happening at the Captain and Commodore levels in my District.
723.	Leadership is not familiar with all active duty requirements, especially in prevention.
724.	I think that safety is important to the leadership, but I have not seen it in action. Luckily have not seen any mishaps that should have been reported
725.	The reason for the #4 response is ,because of the unknown element in the question ;ie personnel, environment, etc.
726.	NO one pays attend to safety. No one tried to check out Safety Information. It is always "Let's hurry so I can go home from the meeting" Hurry up I have other things to do. I want the FSO job so I can get my Tax Break at the end of the year. No one helps the member (Mentor).

	<p>Just give them the job so the Flotilla looks good on paper. No support from the above Staff. Never check on members that are not at the meeting. Only call's member when you want to fill a open Staff officer position. If you ask for help they say I will take care of it, however if you call after two or three weeks - you get this I have been so busy or you need to call this person and then the tell you to call this person. You get the run around back to the first person you spoke with. Never get an answer, even after you send them an e-mail.</p> <p>No one wants to help you. This is why member leave the Auxiliary. They will not do a form to check out - resignation. A lot on the members are just looking out for their self.</p>
727.	I believe with mentoring is key to helping g new members. it help new members and even seniors members opportunity to learn or refresh there skills.
728.	I joined the Auxiliary 5 months ago so I have not had enough exposure to flotilla activities to answer a lot of the questions.
729.	In the last year, my entire exposure to activities has been through email, telephone, web, and virtual-interface (for Flotilla meetings via Zoom).
730.	Many of the entries rated a "3" as I have not experienced any mishaps, near-misses etc. therefor unable to accurately judge an event. What I've seen up to this point is folks are focused on safety and related communication.
731.	Auxiliary Leadership pays lip-service to safety not promote the practices of safety..
732.	Some of my answers were given a 4 rather than a 5 such as with how to report an incident. This interpretation should not be considered as a weakness, but simply a fact in my never having to submit such a report. Unless having had the necessity to do so, that is the only way insure complete understanding.
733.	No Comments
734.	Thank you for conducting this survey and for the efforts to improve Auxiliary Safety.